

JPRS-USA-85-009

29 August 1985

# USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 6, June 1985

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29 August 1985

## USSR REPORT

## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 6, JUNE 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY  
No 6, June 1985

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhkov

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : June 1985

Signed to press : 17 May 1985

Copies : 30,000

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politika, ideologiya", 1985

## UNITED NATIONS AND WASHINGTON POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 3-14

[Article by G. I. Morozov]

[Text] This year the United Nations will be 40 years old. The UN Charter was adopted by an international conference in San Francisco at the end of June 1945. A period of 40 years is long enough to assess its role in international relations. In this article, we will discuss the United Nations' significance in U.S. foreign policy strategy and diplomacy.

An analysis of the American approach to the United Nations reveals important events reflecting the basic tendencies and theories of U.S. foreign policy. It is significant that people in Washington have invariably regarded the United Nations and the organizations making it up only as auxiliary means of attaining national foreign policy objectives and have denied the possibility of finding decisions acceptable to the entire world community. As long as these organizations have complied with U.S. wishes, they have been supported by the administration. In other cases, the situation has been completely different.

Practical policy and scientific theories are quite closely connected in this area, and these theories are assigned the purely functional role of validating American imperialism's actual goals.

This was the practice even during the first years of the United Nations' existence, and it is still characteristic of the United States today, reflecting the selfish fundamentals of American foreign policy and its hegemonic ambitions.

This was quite evident in the U.S. position at the latest, 39th Session of the UN General Assembly in general and in Ronald Reagan's speech at the beginning of the open discussion in particular. This speech adhered to all of the traditions of the florid rhetoric of American politicians, pursuing purely propagandistic goals and concealing Washington's imperious plans.

It is noteworthy that when Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 and had to appoint a permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, he chose a candidate who met the requirements of his imperious view of the United States' role in

this organization. Professor S. Finger, director of the Ralph Bunche Institute of UN Studies (United States), once stressed in a description of Jeane Kirkpatrick that she regarded the United Nations as a "dangerous place" for the United States. Just as Reagan, who tends to look at foreign policy matters through the prism of Soviet-American confrontation, Kirkpatrick feels that "detente was a mistake."<sup>1</sup> Kirkpatrick displayed her ideological kinship with the President in her book "The Reagan Phenomenon"<sup>2</sup> and demonstrated her loyalty to his views in her daily activity in the United Nations.

After Reagan was re-elected, Kirkpatrick, who wanted to be either secretary of state or the President's national security adviser, resigned after neither of those positions was offered to her. Her place in the United Nations was taken by a retired general, Vernon Walters, a former deputy director of the CIA and a man as outspoken as his predecessor in his support for the pursuit of policy from a position of strength.

When the United States rejected all of the constructive proposals made by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, proposals aimed at consolidating peace and reducing the danger of nuclear confrontation, it demonstrated once again that the fundamental aims of American policy had remained essentially unchanged for the past 40 years.

#### United States vs. United Nations

The postwar world has experienced tremendous changes of unprecedented depth and dynamics in the past 40 years, and these changes have affected the United Nations. As a result of the birth of the world socialist system and the collapse of the colonial empire, the number of sovereign states has multiplied. This has made the political map of today's world a complex and multifaceted one.

For this reason, international relations in the spheres of politics, economics, science, technology and others are exceptionally diverse and interrelated and are developing constantly on all levels--governmental and non-governmental. Present-day international relations have also been affected by problems unknown in the past. The main one is the problem of averting nuclear war, the start of which would mean the end of the human race. There are also other exceptionally important global problems requiring the combined efforts of all countries for their resolution.

The very nature of international relations today objectively necessitates the existence of a central organ of multilateral diplomacy and cooperation, primarily for the purpose of maintaining and consolidating peace on the planet. The United Nations, the most important instrument of international relations, is precisely this kind of organization now that it has almost a universal membership and universal authority.

The fact that the United Nations was formed as a result of the victory of united forces for democracy over forces for fascism is of immutable significance in the evaluation of its performance. This is why its main purpose--to

maintain international peace and security and deliver future generations from the horrors of war--was secured by the truly progressive principles of international communication recorded in its charter.

It is noteworthy that even when the nature of the future international organization was being discussed during the war years, Washington strategists tried to base the postwar organization on the principles of the "Pax Americana." For example, they proposed the creation of an organization to put not only the "axis" countries but also the states of the anti-Hitler coalition under American-English rule with the aid of an "international police force" and the armed forces of the United States, England and their allies.<sup>3</sup> By May 1943 it was already apparent that the West wanted to concentrate all power in the post-war world in the hands of a so-called "supreme world council"--an essentially American body with obvious anti-Soviet aims.<sup>4</sup> Most of the U.S. plans for the future international organization openly pursued the goal of Washington's hegemony in world politics and the creation of an anti-Soviet organization after the foundations of the anti-Hitler alliance had been undermined.<sup>5</sup>

The authors of these plans were temporarily silenced, however, by the dramatic upsurge of general democratic feelings engendered by the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Western leaders had to agree to the establishment of the United Nations on the basis of completely different principles--the principles of progressive international law. Subsequent events proved, however, that this was a temporary tactical move.

The comments President H. Truman made in connection with the adoption of the UN Charter at the San Francisco conference in 1945 belong in this description of the propaganda aspects of the position taken by Western leaders when the United Nations was being established: "You have created," he said, "a great instrument of peace, security and human progress throughout the world. Now the world must use it. Our failure to use it will be a betrayal of all those who died so that we could meet here in freedom and security to create this instrument.

"If we try to use it for egotistical purposes, in the interests of one country or a small group of countries, we will be guilty of the same kind of betrayal."<sup>6</sup>

When Truman condemned Hiroshima and Nagasaki to atomic death a few months later, he started the sinister list of betrayals of UN ideals by graphically demonstrating the actual value of "human life and human rights" by Washington's standards. But this was later, and the tone was different from the one used when the United Nations was being created--after all, this was a time when the last volleys of World War II could still be heard and when the Hitlerists were still putting up desperate resistance. Furthermore, it was only the inconceivable efforts of the heroic Red Army that saved the Allies in extremely crucial situations.

At that time U.S. Secretary of State E. Stettinius said that the people attending the conferences leading up to the creation of the United Nations "regarded it as an axiom that the cornerstone of world security was the unity of the states making up the nucleus of the great alliance against the Axis countries."<sup>7</sup> What is more, in reference to the rules of the unanimity of permanent members

of the Security Council, Stettinius stressed: "We must not forget that the inclusion of a statement in the UN Charter about the veto right of the great powers was necessary for the approval of the charter by the people of the United States and the Senate."<sup>8</sup>

As soon as the United Nations had been created and the United States had an obedient "voting machine" in the General Assembly, however, it learned that the Soviet Union's veto power in the Security Council could effectively block American attempts to turn the United Nations into an instrument of imperialist policy. The American efforts to "revise" or "transform" the organization into a club of Western countries with the same views also failed. Then the Americans started an unconcealed campaign against the United Nations, especially its rule of unanimity. In spring 1948 the matters were investigated by the U.S. Senate, which considered eight draft resolutions proposing the revision of the UN Charter and approved the draft of Senator Vandenberg.<sup>9</sup> Later a special commission was set up to consider an entire series of such draft resolutions, and this made the campaign for the revision of the UN Charter, and essentially for its elimination and replacement with an absolutely different organization, official.<sup>10</sup>

When American leaders realized that these plans could not be carried out, they began to violate the UN Charter flagrantly and attack the organization more energetically. They launched an arms race and began to form aggressive blocs, establish a network of anti-Soviet military bases, openly support terrorists and counterrevolutionaries and start armed conflicts.

These actions seriously injured the authority and prestige of the United Nations but could not stop the course of history and all of the related processes in the organization.

#### The United States and the New Situation in the United Nations

The world has changed radically. The collapse of the colonial system more than tripled the number of UN members when the young states joined the organization, and this put the American "voting mechanism" out of commission.

A report prepared by the American UN mission in March 1984 said that the United States had been voting with the minority for a long time. For example, at one of the latest sessions of the General Assembly the position of the USSR, according to the report, was supported 80 percent of the time, while the U.S. position was supported 20 percent of the time, and the United States was the only great power subjected to personal criticism at the session.<sup>11</sup>

American researcher S. Finger also writes about the United States' isolation in the United Nations. He says that this is most apparent in discussions of disarmament issues. At the 37th Session of the General Assembly, for example, the United States was the only country voting against a resolution proposing a nuclear test ban treaty, a resolution banning the arms race in outer space and a resolution proposing the conclusion of bilateral USSR-U.S. talks on chemical weapons.<sup>12</sup>

The author says that "during the previous 38 years of the United Nations' existence, the United States was never alone in any Security Council vote on any resolution criticizing American behavior, but it did have to face this fact on 28 October 1983: No other member voted against the draft resolution condemning the U.S. invasion of Grenada and calling for the removal of the troops." According to S. Finger, "the performance of Moynihan and Kirkpatrick seems to suggest that the strategy of confrontation is in the interests of neither the United States nor the United Nations."<sup>13</sup>

This is understandable in view of the fact that the United States is flagrantly violating its UN commitments, and this has been particularly evident under the Reagan Administration. The United States has persistently tried to cancel out the positive results of past UN activity and is openly referring to the United Nations as "an arena of senseless disputes," of the "tyranny of an irresponsible majority" and so forth.

Washington's present policy is contrary to the vital interests of the entire world community, and this has also been quite apparent in U.S. behavior in the United Nations. It is precisely to the United Nations that the American administration addresses its threats, and Americans are demanding the withdrawal of the United States from the organization. An unconcealed struggle is being waged for the liquidation of the organization.<sup>14</sup>

Ascertaining the United States' groundless position with regard to the United Nations, THE NEW YORK TIMES commented: "We are among the most apathetic UN members, behaving as if our previous enthusiasm is merely an unpleasant memory today. Some of us still feel nostalgic about a United Nations that never existed, some are displeased with it in its present form and some are so disappointed that they talk about withdrawing from the organization altogether if sweeping changes are not made throughout the system. The head of our delegation, Jeane Kirkpatrick, has repeatedly questioned the value of this organization from the standpoint of propaganda and the protection of American interests and, quite frankly, our relationship with the United Nations poses a serious problem. But is it really time to consider throwing the baby out with the bath water?

"We are entertaining illusions if we believe that the problem will disappear. If we seriously want to change the United Nations, we should start here, at home, and boldly face the fact that in spite of all the noble and lofty dreams that inspired us in 1945 when the United Nations was created, our position was ambiguous."<sup>15</sup>

But far from everyone in the United States would agree with this. Just before the 1984 presidential elections and the start of the 39th Session of the General Assembly, a publication called "A World Without a UN" was prepared by the Heritage Foundation, an extremely reactionary American research organization.<sup>16</sup> This is a quasi-official book, with a preface by C. Lichtenstein, the former deputy permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, the same man who announced in the committee in charge of the organization's contacts with the host country in September 1983 that the UN members dissatisfied with their treatment in the United States could "get off" its territory.

"A World Without a UN" is an apology for the United States' hegemonic ambitions and its defiantly imperious attitude toward the United Nations. The authors are angry about the absence of support for the United States in the General Assembly, as if the United Nations, and not American policy, were to blame for this. It is true that there is a definite problem, in view of the fact that the United States was the only one to vote against the resolution on the "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" at the 38th Session of the General Assembly. Many such examples could be cited.

More and more Americans are complaining that the United Nations "is turning into an anti-American, anti-Western organization, hostile to the system of private enterprise," and that its activities have been increasingly "politicized," which is supposedly contrary to the original purpose of the organization.

Lichtenstein and his colleagues are enraged by the efforts by peaceful UN members to effect disarmament, establish a new international economic order and solve global problems. They are openly spiteful about the criticism of the policies of Israel, Chile and South Africa--the allies in the United States' own aggressive policy. They are also angry when members advocate the nationalization of the economies of developing countries and the reinforcement of their state sector. The authors condemn the United Nations for granting official status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), representing people fighting for their freedom and the right to set up their own state.

The U.S. attitude toward developing countries defending their own rights in the United Nations is permeated with racism and chauvinism. Their representatives are supposedly "unprepared to speak in the United Nations.... They are inexperienced in international affairs and ignorant about history."<sup>17</sup>

According to a report in the Indian press, a high-level White House spokesman who addressed American diplomats at a special briefing for members of the American UN mission did not conceal his anger that some developing states are trying to use the UN forum to criticize Washington policy. "We cannot allow this kind of 'riffraff,'" the American diplomat arrogantly declared, "to take an openly hostile stand against the United States."

Statements like these, which are inaccurate to say the very least, are characteristic of Washington's entire approach to the developing countries. In particular, they were reflected in another work prepared by the Heritage Foundation--"The United States in the UN: Time To Reconsider." It refers to representatives of the developing world as intellectual and political inferiors.<sup>18</sup>

The ideologists of the "new U.S. attitude" toward the United Nations advocate an overt struggle against it, even to the point of its total liquidation. They have issued ultimata to the world community, essentially summing up Washington's official position: the cessation of the "politicization" of the UN system, the refusal to cooperate with the PLO and SWAPO, the prohibition of statements against the "system of free enterprise," the establishment of direct control

over UN spending by the U.S. State Department, etc. Alleging that the United Nations has become a threat to U.S. national interests, they assert that the just principle of "one country, one vote" in voting in the General Assembly is no longer acceptable to Washington. In their opinion, the stock-market principle of "percentage" voting should be employed here. This would give countries a chance to influence decision-making in proportion to their contribution to the organization's budget or, in other words, to pay for acceptable UN decisions and reject unacceptable ones.

"If these reforms are not accepted by the United Nations or are not implemented, the United States and other democratic countries (this is an obvious reference to the capitalist powers) will have to consider the possibility of withdrawing from the United Nations. If this should lead to the eventual dissolution of the United Nations...the world will be no worse off"<sup>19</sup>--this is a good example of this line of reasoning.

It is noteworthy that the United States is undermining the bases of normal international relations with its attacks on the United Nations and the organizations making it up. The conflict between this position and the interests of the world's people is leading to inconsistent American behavior, in which blackmail alternates with clumsy manipulative efforts.

In 1977, for example, President J. Carter announced the United States' withdrawal from the International Labor Organization (ILO). The official reason was the "politicization" of the organization. In fact, however, Washington was angry about the ILO resolutions condemning imperialist and terrorist regimes. The blackmail did not work, and the United States rejoined the ILO after 3 years of isolation.

In 1982 Ronald Reagan launched an attack on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The excuse this time was the cancellation of Israel's rights in the organization for its raid on the nuclear research center in Iraq. The American delegation responded to this decision by ostentatiously walking out of an IAEA session. The United States stopped paying its dues and announced its intention to withdraw from the agency. Again, however, the State Department's bullets did not reach their target. In spring 1983 the United States resumed the payment of dues after proving its political bankruptcy.

The World Health Organization became the target of pointed criticism at the same time for its support of the new international economic order.

At the 29th Session of the UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) Council in 1984, the United States resolved, with the support of its closest NATO allies, to disrupt the operations of the UNCTAD Secretariat and refused to develop constructive cooperation for the purpose of surmounting the economic difficulties of developing countries. The West sabotaged the adoption of decisions specifically related to the preparations for a council session on the ministerial level in 1985. According to a report in the Indian magazine MAINSTREAM, the United States divulged its plans to leave UNCTAD in a report submitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1984. Again, "politicization" and "state theories" (a reference to the criticism of the private sector in general and the policy of TNC's in particular) were cited as the reason.<sup>20</sup>

The magazine expressed the opinion that the U.S. position on a number of specialized UN establishments "is not an isolated change in policy, but a well-planned strategy aimed at forcing the developing countries to meet the terms of the industrially developed West.... We see the same problems in UNCTAD (as in UNESCO), in such areas as aid to the Palestinian Arabs, economic cooperation between developing countries..."<sup>21</sup>

The United States was particularly disturbed by the UNCTAD studies which shed light on the negative role of transnational corporations, the IBRD, the IMF and the GATT.

The State Department has periodically attacked and threatened other UN organizations as well: the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the UN Environment Programme, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Committee on the Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes and the Children's Fund.

The United States decided to deal its most crushing blow to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In June 1983 official administration spokesmen announced that unless UNESCO made around 150 changes in its structure and activities in accordance with U.S. recommendations, the United States would withdraw from UNESCO on 1 January 1985, and it then acted on this threat on the first day of 1985. The reason was again declared to be the "politicization" of UNESCO activity, taking the form of the discussion of disarmament issues and the condemnation of Israel, Chile and South Africa by UNESCO members (just as, incidentally, by the United Nations itself and by several other specialized UN agencies).

The United States was particularly irritated by the UNESCO actions in favor of the "new international order in the sphere of information and communication," intended to end the authoritarian behavior of powerful Western news agencies in developing countries and to aid these countries in establishing their own sources of information. UNESCO began moving in this direction by aiding in the establishment of an Africa-wide news agency. This was related to the decision to assist liberation movements recognized by the OAU: the South African ANC, SWAPO and the PLO. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the United States was displeased by UNESCO's line. S. Palma, former assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs in the Nixon administration and member of the executive committee of the American National UNESCO Commission, said frankly that the decision to withdraw from the organization reflected the Reagan Administration's dissatisfaction with the "domination of the UN system by developing countries."

When American officials have voiced specific complaints about the "politicization" of UNESCO, they have mentioned the discussion of disarmament issues, the expression of sympathy for national liberation movements, the support of proposals regarding peace and disarmament education in the schools, the support of the renunciation of a market economy in developing countries and the consolidation of the state's role there in certain areas, the condemnation of TNC's, the decision to celebrate the centennial of Karl Marx' death, the proposal that the next session of the General Conference be held in Bulgaria, and many other decisions which would take far too much room to list.

The complaints about the "politicization" of the activities of international organizations are groundless in principle, and UNESCO provides a convincing example of this. Our time is a time of the organic and indissoluble interconnection of the most important problems: political and economic, social and cultural, etc. The most important, the need to keep the peace, cannot be isolated from politics because it is, just as all of its diverse elements, deeply political in the true sense of the word. For this reason, the concept of "politicization" can be unacceptable only to forces and countries pursuing an aggressive line.

Speaking of UNESCO, it is impossible to ignore the fact that its very creation was a political act by the United Nations, an act which obliterated Hitlerism from the face of the earth. "Thoughts about war," the preamble to the UNESCO Charter says, "arise in the minds of people, and for this reason the idea of defending peace must be firmly established in the human mind." Given the present U.S. escalation of the danger of war, the fight for people's minds and for their unification against nuclear death is of primary and truly vital importance. UNESCO has a number of aims and objectives, but the most important aim and the most important function of the organization is the maximum promotion of the maintenance and consolidation of peace and the elimination of the current danger that our planet could become a lifeless desert contaminated by lethal radioactive poisons.

When we examine this problem from the political standpoint, we must agree with the French magazine NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR that "it was probably no coincidence that the beginning of the UNESCO crisis (June 1983) coincided with the preparations for the deployment of the Pershing II's in Europe."<sup>22</sup>

In reference to the overseas accusations about the "politicization" of the United Nations, UNESCO and several other international organizations, we must agree with what UNESCO Director General M'Bow said when he was interviewed by the Parisian magazine POLITIQUES ETRANGERES: "UNESCO was not created to serve the interests of one state or a specific group of states. If it had done this, it would have lost its international status and, consequently, the reason for its existence. It was created to promote mutual understanding among all peoples and cooperation among all countries."

In this interview, M'Bow stressed that "those who are expressing regrets today about what they call the 'politicization' of UNESCO seem to be complaining that opinions other than their own are being expressed in the organization. UNESCO is an intergovernmental organization. It is quite natural that each of the 161 states in it will express its own ideas, its own wishes and its own view of the world. But no single current can hope for supremacy."

UNESCO has taken several measures to preserve the cultural heritage of the human race and has held hundreds of conferences and seminars at which studies of the world's problems have been discussed along with the topics of hydrology, cave paintings and spoken languages.

The positive UNESCO undertakings include, for example, a project to save Mohenjo-Daro, the ruins of one of the most famous cities of the Indian

civilization, which existed 3,000 years ago; student grants in developing countries; the implementation of programs financed by other organizations; other measures to develop education in the emerging countries. The magazine COURIER UNESCO is published in 28 languages and quarterly editions in braille. The list of positive aspects of UNESCO activity is quite long, and this is why the U.S. blackmail and pressure of the organization have been condemned so vehemently throughout the world. These feelings were expressed clearly at a special seminar in August 1984 in the Indian capital. It was attended by public spokesmen, editors of major magazines and newspapers and representatives of telegraph agencies and radio stations in India. Prime Minister I. Gandhi of India sent seminar participants a telegram in which she censured the U.S. attempts to undermine UNESCO's influence. The seminar passed a special resolution asking the countries of the world to defend UNESCO against U.S. attacks.

The majority of "Third World" countries are completely justified, N. Singh, a Carnegie Endowment staffer, wrote, in their contemptuous "view of U.S. behavior as something tantamount to an attempt to deprive the developing states of the fruits of their independence."<sup>23</sup> The same view was expressed by an instructor at the Institute of Higher International Studies in Geneva, V. Gebhali. The U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, he wrote, "will widen the gap between it and the Third World, which is loyal to the organization actively defending its cultural uniqueness."<sup>24</sup>

And this is true. After all, the UNESCO program and UNESCO activity take full consideration of the situation existing in the developing countries as a result of their prolonged domination by merciless exploitative powers. The U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO and the resulting blow to its budget will have the most negative effect on these countries and will create additional difficulties in the eradication of their underdevelopment. The threat is all the greater now that some of the United States' closest NATO allies are preparing to follow their senior partner's example. England has already officially announced its withdrawal from UNESCO on 31 December 1985.

It is not enough, however, to view the U.S. actions against UNESCO only as a sign of brutal behavior toward developing countries. Americans are not concealing the fact that UNESCO was chosen for this purpose as one of the least protected international organizations. In connection with this, C. Maynes, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs in the Carter Administration, wrote that "UNESCO is the UN Grenada," not bothering to conceal the fact that the United States regards UNESCO as the "weakest international organization."<sup>25</sup>

The concepts of "strength" and "weakness" in this case should be measured by American standards, which place no value on any kind of humanitarian activity, including actions to promote UN ideals, and which acknowledge only missiles with nuclear warheads, the rapid-firing 12-inch guns of the battleship "New Jersey" and other such equipment as factors of strength. In the final analysis, this is a continuation of the campaign of blackmail and pressure on the United Nations, the continuation of the series of actions intended to exert pressure on the organization itself in the spirit of the old American reactionary slogan "U.S. out of the UN, UN out of the U.S!"<sup>26</sup>

Obviously, these extremes do not reflect all of American public opinion, particularly the views of the intellectuals who realize the negative implications of the U.S. policy of setting itself up against the countries of the world community, especially the United Nations and its specialized organizations. They have objected more than once to "power diplomacy" in international organizations. These views are also shared by many sensible scientists and politicians in the West European countries, who realize where the opposition of the world community with imperious ambitions is leading.

Reactionary officials in U.S. government agencies are still taking the lead, however, in decisions on these matters. According to reports in the press, aim has been taken at 96 UN programs and international organizations.

American computers are recording the position of all members of these organizations with regard to the United States. "Under the stern gaze of the U.S. Congress," a report said, "the loyalty of UN members has been tested, country by country, and the results have shown insufficient loyalty, if not downright hostility. The countries with the fewest points...can expect a warning at best and the loss of millions of dollars in U.S. aid to foreign states at worst."<sup>27</sup> The United States is already using financial sanctions of this kind, as mentioned above, against developing countries displaying independence.

Even in the past, however, blackmail and saber-rattling have not benefited Washington, and this policy has even less chance of success today, now that people are rejecting Washington's diktat and hegemonism, which are rekindling their memories of the worst pages of past history.

The United Nations is playing an important role in the world community's struggle to avert the nuclear danger. This is why many states feel obligated to guard it against attacks and against the policy of blackmail, "power diplomacy" and attempts to eliminate it.

The UN experience testifies that when its members act in concert, the possibilities afforded by its charter produce positive results in spite of the opposition of reactionary forces. As the most important instrument of multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations has done much to promote the widespread discussion and resolution of several international problems. The United Nations has also become a central legislative body, promoting the drafting of documents contributing to the progressive development of international law. Some specific examples are the 1960 General Assembly declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the 1970 declaration on the principles of international law on friendly relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the UN Charter, the 1977 declaration on the intensification and consolidation of international detente and the definition of aggression, the UN Security Council decisions on sanctions against the regime in Southern Rhodesia, the work on the preparation of conventions to regulate the law of the sea and space law, etc.

The latest, 39th Session of the UN General Assembly had extremely important positive results.

With no fear of exaggeration, we can say that the United Nations is still making a definite positive contribution to the cause of peace, in spite of

all the difficulties and obstacles created by imperialist forces. The fuller realization of its potential will naturally require conscientious cooperation by its members and the unconditional observance of the spirit and letter of its charter.

This is precisely the USSR's position on the United Nations, and this is acknowledged by all objective people. "The USSR's firm support of the UN efforts to guarantee peace, security, justice and progress has been of decisive importance for this organization, in whose creation the Soviet Union was instrumental," UN Secretary-General J. Perez de Cuellar said.<sup>28</sup>

In the current, extremely complex world situation, the USSR is continuing to defend the principles of the UN Charter and fight for the maximally effective use of this organization to improve the political climate and avert thermo-nuclear catastrophe as an instrument for the resolution of international conflicts and the maintenance and expansion of cooperation between the states of the world. Many Soviet initiatives on these matters of vital importance have been supported by the majority of UN members and are recorded in resolutions, declarations and draft conventions.

The Soviet Union's behavior is guided by a recognition of the United Nations' role as a center for the "coordination of the actions of nations" in the interests of lasting peace, especially their efforts to alleviate the nuclear threat and solve other urgent problems.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. S. Finger, "The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the United Nations," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1983/84, vol 62, No 2, pp 436-457.
2. J. Kirkpatrick, "The Reagan Phenomenon--and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy," Wash., 1983.
3. S. Boratynskiy, "Diplomatiya perioda vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [World War II Diplomacy], Moscow, 1959, p 203.
4. R. Russell, "A History of the United Nations Charter," Wash., 1958, p 106.
5. The American groups most active in the compilation of such drafts included the "Commission for the Study of the Organization of Peace," the "University Committee," uniting around 100 groups, the Manly-Hudson Committee, the Committee of the AF of L and others (S. B. Krylov, "Istoriya sozdaniya Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsiy" [History of the Creation of the United Nations], Moscow, 1960, pp 23-33; D. B. Levin, "The International Organization of Security," IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, 1945, No 1, pp 4-7).
6. "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Union at International Conferences During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], collected documents, vol V, Moscow, 1980, p 298.

7. "U.S. Department of State. Charter of the United Nations," pub 2349, June 1945, p 68.
8. PRAVDA, 15 September 1947.
9. "Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2d Session"; F. Wilcox and C. Marcy, "Proposals for Changes in the UN," Wash., 1955, p 44.
10. It is indicative that even during the initial period of the United Nations' existence, there were people in the United States who accused F. Roosevelt of "betraying" national interests by, as they put it, cooperating with the USSR in the creation of the United Nations. This is precisely what American C. Manly was writing about (C. Manly, "The UN Record. Ten Fateful Years for America," Chicago, 1955, p 233). "The United Nations is an instrument of subversive activity and poses an increasingly dangerous threat to our (U.S.--G. M.) state sovereignty and individual liberty." He demanded the "severance of U.S. ties with the United Nations." Numerous editions of a new UN Charter were prepared in the United States. The most radical changes were proposed by American jurists G. Clark and L. Sohn (G. Clark and L. Sohn, "World Peace Through World Law," Cambridge, Mass, 1966).
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 March 1984. "The Reagan Administration," THE WASHINGTON POST recently commented, "is apparently used to a position of absolute isolation in the United Nations when matters of policy are discussed" (THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 August 1984).
12. S. Finger, Op. cit., p 455.
13. Ibid., pp 456, 457.
14. The U.S. threats to take "decisive" and "dynamic" action against the United Nations have already been reinforced with measures to cut off aid to states voting against "American interests." On the initiative of Senator R. Kasten (Republican, Wisconsin), the Congress passed a law to this effect. This financial "penalty" has already been suffered by some developing countries taking a position against the United States in the organization.
15. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 September 1984.
16. "A World Without a UN. What Would Happen If the United Nations Shut Down," N.Y., 1984. This organization, which was founded in 1973, is a "think tank" of the Republican Party right wing. The United Nations is the subject of more than a quarter of its propaganda publications "validating" the hostility of influential U.S. circles toward the United Nations. The organization has published around 20 works attacking the world community in a year and a half. The publications are distributed to members of Congress and the administration and to 6,000 journalists, publishers and academics. The organization shares staff members with government agencies.

17. *Ibid.*, p XVI.
18. The Heritage Foundation. BACKGROUNDER, No 293, 29 September 1983.
19. "A World Without a UN," p XVIII.
20. MAINSTREAM, 31 March 1984, p 2.
21. *Ibid.*, pp 3-4.
22. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 30 March-5 April 1984, p 31.
23. NEWSWEEK, 13 February 1984, p 4.
24. V. Gebhali, "Les Etats-Unis et l'UNESCO: analyse d'une crise," DEFENSE NATIONALE, May 1984, p 63.
25. NEWSWEEK, 9 January 1984, p 32.
26. It was no coincidence that reactionary U.S. organizations, especially the John Birch Society, made their support of Ronald Reagan in the 1984 campaign conditional upon U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations. In this connection, it is indicative that Congress had to conduct hearings on whether or not UN headquarters should be allowed to remain in New York.
27. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 5 April 1984, p 40.
28. PRAVDA, 16 April 1984.

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## U.S. ISOLATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 14-16

[Article by V. V. Chernyshev]

[Text] The American UN mission has prepared a document on the results of votes at the 39th General Assembly session. These data attest to the increasing isolation of the United States in the most representative and authoritative international organization and to Washington's hostile response to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of states in the world.

During the 39th Session, according to the count of the American mission, 187 matters were settled without a vote on the basis of a consensus, and votes were taken on 153 matters (in some cases, on individual articles of resolutions as well as on the resolutions as a whole). For the United States the results were absolutely deplorable: It voted with the majority of the international community in only 21 percent of all cases. In other words, the American delegation opposed the majority in four out of five cases. The isolation of the United States in the largest international forum has grown much more severe even in comparison to the previous session, when the United States voted with the majority in 25.5 percent of all cases.\*

For fully understandable reasons, the most obsequious pro-American line in the United Nations has been pursued by Israel, which voted with the United States in 88.5 percent of all cases at the last session. The NATO partners have obediently followed in Washington's wake, although even they have not always supported Washington. England voted with the United States in 82.1 percent

\* The U.S. isolation at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly was particularly apparent during votes on resolutions on disarmament, the cessation of the arms race and the prevention of its extension to outer space. For example, in the votes on 20 resolutions condemning nuclear war, appealing for no first use of nuclear weapons, prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, proposing a nuclear freeze and the cessation of nuclear tests and so forth, the United States voted against 19 and abstained once (the resolution on the prevention of nuclear war), whereas the overwhelming majority of UN members voted for these resolutions (DIE WAHRHEIT, 19 September 1984).

of all cases, and the figures for other countries were 80 percent for the FRG, 76.6 percent for Belgium, 74.5 percent for the Netherlands, 72.1 percent for France and 72.8 percent for Italy. A more independent course, dictated by national interests, was followed by Turkey (35 percent) and Greece (27.6 percent). In more than half of all cases the U.S. position diverged from that of such European states as Sweden (41.9 percent), Finland (39.4 percent) and Austria (38.7 percent).

An analysis of the votes at the 39th session of the General Assembly clearly demonstrates the incompatible positions of the United States and the non-aligned states, which resolutely rejected the alien policy Washington tried to impose on them. They voted with the United States in only 12.8 percent of all cases (in contrast to 18.9 percent at the previous session). Even this indicator was achieved only as a result of the servile submission of puppet regimes in Grenada (60 percent), St. Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis (45.8 percent) and Belize (39.1 percent). The U.S. stand on all of the main issues of the present day was consistently rejected by such key countries in the non-aligned movement as Mexico (9 percent), Yugoslavia (8.8 percent), India (6.5 percent) and Algeria (4.3 percent).

The regional voting "pattern" also testifies that American diplomacy can take little credit for the results of the session. Among the Latin American countries, which the United States is accustomed to calling its "backyard," the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Paraguay supported the U.S. stand most frequently. The leading Latin American states, on the other hand--Mexico (9 percent), Argentina (13.5 percent), Brazil (14.8 percent) and Venezuela (13.9 percent), not to mention Cuba, Nicaragua, Surinam and Guyana--showed Washington quite clearly that the language of diktat has little chance of success in the Western Hemisphere.

The position of Arab states in the United Nations testifies that they resolutely reject U.S. policy, which is profoundly hostile to them. On the average, they voted with Washington in only 10 percent of all cases, with Morocco (20.1 percent), Somalia (14.1 percent) and the ARE (12.5 percent) leading the rest. Jordan and Saudi Arabia opposed the United States in virtually 9 out of every 10 cases. Libya, Syria, the PDRY and Algeria were the most steadfast opponents of the American line.

Around the same percentage of views "coinciding" with U.S. views, 12.8 percent, was recorded among the African states, which are angry about Washington's policy of "constructive cooperation" with Pretoria and the neocolonial U.S. economic policy in Africa. The Ivory Coast, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Chad, Togo, Gabon, Mauritania and Zaire voted with the United States most frequently (from 20 to 29.8 percent), but Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Sao Tome and Principe, Uganda, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, the Congo, Benin, Angola, Swaziland and Mozambique voted with the United States in less than 10 percent of all cases.

The countries of Asia and Oceania (with an average indicator of 14.9 percent) most likely to vote with the United States were Japan (70.9 percent), Australia (62.4 percent), New Zealand (60.6 percent), Singapore (20.2 percent),

the Philippines (19.2 percent), Burma (15.9 percent), Thailand (14.5 percent) and Pakistan (12.7 percent), although the United States hardly received the kind of support it expected from these countries, with the exception of the first three on the list.

Judging by the results of the votes, China, which voted with the United States in only 11.1 percent of all cases, displayed definite non-acceptance of the American line.

The constructive position taken at the session by the USSR, the Warsaw Pact countries and the other socialist states was supported by the overwhelming majority of developing countries and evoked only stubborn resistance from the United States and its closest partners.

When J. Kirkpatrick, who was then still the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, addressed a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, she stressed that an analysis of the results of UN votes "will provide Congress with reliable information about the degree to which other governments support views, values and policies similar to our own" and an opportunity to "properly assess actions consistent with, or contrary to, U.S. vital interests." On the basis of these data, Washington should "let other countries know that their attitude toward us in the United Nations will affect our bilateral relations with them outside this organization," so that they "will show more respect for our concerns and interests."

The increasing isolation of the United States in the United Nations has been quite painful for Washington because it cannot simply ignore the decisions of the international community, which have a significant effect on world public opinion and the international climate. The same Kirkpatrick remarked that "what happens in the United Nations affects central issues of world politics and often the most vital U.S. national goals and interests."

The decisions of the UN General Assembly are important to American diplomacy, the report said, for the following main reasons:

They essentially determine the policy of UN bodies and the entire UN system with its budget of over 4 billion dollars and its staff of around 50,000;

They focus world attention on the main problems of the present day;

They determine the international climate in which the U.S. Government and American businessmen must operate;

They affect international opinion on major issues, and since there is no other forum where all states can express their political views, UN decisions are regarded everywhere as the most meaningful expressions of the "opinions of the international community."

Washington is "especially interested," as Kirkpatrick said, not in all resolutions, but only in those "affecting U.S. interests and goals." The mission singled out 10 such issues at the last session, issues warranting U.S. pressure on other countries, including the question of Israel's authority;

the resolution on Cambodia; the U.S.-proposed amendment to the resolution on the military activities of states on dependent territories, aimed at removing all criticism and even the mere mention of the United States; the question of building a UN conference center in Ethiopia; the proposed removal of criticism of the United States from the resolutions on the Middle East, and others.

As American diplomats frankly admit, their primary objective is the removal of as much criticism of the United States as possible from the decisions of the General Assembly. Kirkpatrick has explained that the reasons for this are much more important than Washington's "oversensitivity." The Soviet Union, she explained, "has proved to be an influential power capable of acting effectively and efficiently, a power which must be taken into account by the international community. Consequently, it and its allies must be treated as influential and useful friends. The successes and significance of the Soviet Union in the United Nations provide additional incentives for the consideration of Soviet views and the establishment of contacts with the Eastern bloc. When the United States and its friends are the target of fierce and frequently unfair attacks, they appear to be countries without any influence, and alliance with them becomes undesirable, if not dangerous. Therefore, the distribution of votes in the United Nations colors perceptions of the importance of specific countries and of their actual influence inside and outside the UN system."

As members of UN circles have pointed out, American diplomacy has already begun choosing the main issues on which it will focus attention at the coming 40th Session of the UN General Assembly, familiarizing other states with the American approach to them and informing them of the "essence and content" of the problems. The United States engages in this kind of lobbying within the United Nations and in some foreign embassies in Washington, but especially in American embassies abroad.

Methods of economic blackmail are being used actively, and primarily against the debt-ridden developing states and the African countries experiencing a severe crisis.

Preparations are also being made for legislative measures. According to news reports, a bill envisaging the automatic cessation of aid to any country voting against the United States in more than 80 percent of all cases in the United Nations will be introduced in the Congress. This intention has been specifically announced by Congressman R. Walker, who has said that the bill will set standards to judge a country's "eligibility" for American assistance and credit.

In this way, the United States is offering vivid proof that it is seeking an escape from its isolation in the United Nations not through a discerning analysis of its own policy, but through forcible pressure in all areas of international relations.

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## **ARBATOV SPEAKS ON ARMS ISSUES, U.S.-SOVIET TIES**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA** in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 40-46

[Article by G. A. Arbatov: "Prospects of Soviet-American Relations"--speech given at annual congress of International Association of Political Sciences in Washington on 6 March]

[Text] More than once in history people and entire states have acted counter to their own interests. This happens because people make mistakes. States also make mistakes. But until recently the consequences of even the most dangerous of these mistakes have not been irreversible. They have been tragic--I am referring primarily to wars. They have brought death, disaster and suffering. But one generation passes, then another, and life more or less returns to normal. Life goes on. The development of human civilization, its progress, continues. Now we live under totally different conditions. There are mistakes that we have finally and irrevocably lost the right to make--if I can be permitted to express myself as such--under the threat of a universal death penalty.

As a result, consideration of these changes in policy and in the very approach to international relations is becoming a most relevant task. A radical turn away from age-old traditions, forms and models of conduct has occurred in this sphere. A very great deal of what has become customary, fixed and established in people's minds and in state policies as diverse truths needs to be critically reappraised and is becoming a luxury which mankind can no longer allow itself.

Let us take the attitude to war. Until recently, war was considered a normal means of resolving international problems and frequently also a noble and valiant cause. The entire 20th century can be regarded from the standpoint of a growing protest against this traditional view of war. In the 20th century wars have become world wars and devastating on an unprecedented scale: For the first time in the history of mankind, growth in the number of war victims has outstripped population growth. The appearance of nuclear weapons has put an end to the traditional attitude to war.

From "continuing policy by other means," war has become a means of universal genocide. However, stop and think: How deeply have we grasped the reality of

the historical impasse in which the ancient art of war finds itself? The role played by force, primarily armed force, in world politics has also changed. Force, alas, still occupies an impressive place in human affairs, particularly international affairs. Throughout almost all of human history the law of the jungle has dominated in this sphere--both before the birth of international law and, unfortunately, after it. Of course, in our time it is not accepted to openly declare, "He who is strong is right." Instead it is accepted to talk about "spheres of vital interest" and of "peace from a position of strength." But the essence of the policy remains the same.

Meanwhile, reality imperiously demands a radical revision of the approach to the role of force in international affairs.

I do not wish to exaggerate the risk to which mankind is today subject in connection with the continuing arms race. I do not yet consider the probability of a nuclear war through conscious design to be high. What is more probable is the unleashing of a nuclear war as a result of miscalculation, error, or escalation in a non-nuclear conflict. However, I would like to cite the opinion of an American acquaintance who spent several years directly at "the push buttons" of nuclear war. As he loves to say, even the level of danger which now exists is unacceptably high because the cost of just one mistake could be immense.

Another concept that requires reinterpretation is that of victory. What does victory in war mean today? Or in the arms race? A strange feeling arises when one becomes acquainted with certain contemporary military doctrines which set the goal of "gaining the upper hand in a nuclear conflict." The senselessness of the idea that victory is possible in a nuclear war is obvious. But something else is not clear: Does this idea reflect the real insanity of its authors and inspirers, or is it calculated insanity, so to speak, to instill fear in the other side?

However, is the difference between the two so very great? A conscious game of nuclear "Russian roulette" (which, incidentally, was invented in the American, and not the Russian, army more than a hundred years ago) can lead to a catastrophe no less quickly and surely than an attack of insanity....

An unlimited arms race is another luxury mankind can no longer allow itself. The arms race at its present stage increases the threat of war many times over. In this respect the time factor acquires great significance: Having used up negotiations, one fine day we could find that we have entered a "non-negotiating" age. New weapons systems capable of excluding the very possibility of arms limitation and reduction are approaching. Cruise missiles threaten to make the verification of any agreements (in the effectiveness of which we, incidentally, are no less interested than the United States) technically impossible. The creation and deployment of more and more new systems calculated to carry out a pre-emptive, disarming strike will make the development of a formula for strategic stability which satisfies the security interests of both sides extremely difficult, if not impossible. Finally, space weapons are being created with the unconcealed aim of destroying the nuclear "stalemate," the existence of which has helped, in one way or another, to avoid a nuclear war for three decades now.

The arms race has also become an inadmissible luxury in the economic sense. There is no doubt that some in America will take this statement by a Soviet representative as confirmation of the correctness of the strategy of economically "exhausting" the USSR and its allies in military competition. There is no denying it: We are very reluctant to spend money on arms when there are so many economic, social and cultural needs that require a great deal of resources and effort. But I would like to ask my American audience a question: Does your own society not have problems which require greater outlays? Can one, for example, consider it normal that 35 million people in the most economically powerful country in the world live below the poverty level, 3 million are homeless, public transportation is in a deplorable condition, and the crisis of the American family farm is worsening? And take the problems of public health care and education, and slums in the large cities. Surely America has something in which to invest money and has more constructive spheres for the use of its resources than building instruments of murder and destruction?

Returning to the plans to economically undermine the USSR by forcing an arms race on it, I would like to say: Yes, the arms race is capable of slowing down progress in socialist countries, but it is not a case of "to be or not to be" for them. We stood our ground when we were a great deal poorer and economically weaker, and we will stand our ground now. Yes, we have a lower gross national product, but we can--if need be--endure more. The arms race has not failed to leave its mark on the U.S. economy either.

Of course, we exist in different social dimensions, and the consequences of the arms race affect our systems in different ways. But the effect is equally pernicious for both.

What is more, we live in the same world and comprise an insignificant minority. The majority suffers from this arms race, and suffers very badly. One of the reasons is that this arms race destabilizes the whole world in the financial respect. Although Hegel said that in every real tragedy both sides are innocent, the USSR can in no way share the responsibility for this destabilization (both because of the inconvertibility of the ruble and because we cannot, even if we wished, compete with the Americans in their ability to export their problems). The deficit in the U.S. federal budget, primarily caused by the gigantic increase in military spending, has become a global problem. It torments the West Europeans, for example, because the high interest rates it has engendered and the excessively high dollar exchange rate are sucking dry West European capital, depreciating West European currencies and preventing Western Europe from pulling itself out of the quagmire of recession more quickly.

Of course, America will also have to pay for all this at some time. But there is a saying: Those who build jails are rarely incarcerated in them. The consequences of the present shortsighted and selfish course will have to be disentangled not by those who pursue this course, but by future presidents and even future generations of Americans--both economically, by paying off the fantastic state debt, and politically. The arms race developed by the present administration is calculated for many years, for decades, and consequently its

destabilizing nature and the increasing threat of war will also be manifest under future administrations.

But the troubles of Western Europe are nothing in comparison with what is happening in the Third World. The economic pressure of the American budget deficit is squeezing the developing countries especially hard. They borrowed cheap dollars but are being forced to pay their debts in expensive dollars and at rates of interest which would have been considered usurious just a few years ago. As a result, the lion's share of their revenues is spent not on development, not on the improvement of the living conditions of the poorest people on earth, but on interest payments. This is also jeopardizing the U.S. economy: Hundreds of billions in credit extended by American banks, credit which no one knows how to pay off--is this not a risk for the entire financial system of the United States? But the people of the developing countries are suffering, starving and living in poverty even now. And this is, after all, the majority of mankind.

I have now been participating for several years in the work of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues headed by Olof Palme, the prime minister of Sweden. The members of the commission include prominent representatives from the developing countries: Shridath Ramphal from Guyana, general secretary of the Commonwealth; Salim Salim, prime minister of Tanzania; Olusegun Obasanjo, former head of Nigeria; and others. In 1984 the commission met in Chicago, and I would recommend that you acquaint yourselves with the declaration produced there.

Two months ago I participated in another representative forum, the conference in Athens on the proposal of the four continents' initiative on disarmament issues. When the heads of government of six states--India, Mexico, Sweden, Tanzania, Argentina and Greece--met in Delhi in January 1985, they made an urgent appeal to the nuclear powers to halt the arms race before it is too late.\*

I must admit that both of these meetings had a powerful effect on me. Never before had I had the occasion to hear such notes of anger and desperation in speeches on issues of war and peace by representatives of non-nuclear countries, and particularly of those which are customarily called developing countries.

It seems to me that the non-nuclear countries are forming their own new consensus among themselves about what is happening in the world. They are alarmed by three main aspects of world development: the military, economic and political aspects.

The essence of the military aspect is expressly formulated in the Delhi declaration of the six states:

"In the last four decades all countries and all peoples have, almost unnoticed, ceased to be masters of their own existence. We have all become used to

\* See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1985, pp 119, 121--  
Editor's note.

the fact that a small handful of men and machines in faraway cities can determine our fate. Each day in our lives becomes a gift of charity, as if mankind as a whole has become a prisoner in a condemned cell, awaiting the unknown moment of execution."

We, the representatives of the more fortunate and militarily powerful portion of mankind, are really faced with a great moral question here: Who has the right to decide, whether voluntarily or not, questions of the life and death of the world's population, and in the final analysis, what does that population's reaction to this mean for the nuclear powers themselves?

I have already spoken about the economic consequences of the arms race. But it is also necessary to bear in mind the political consequences, since the desperate economic position of some countries often leads to political destabilization, with unforeseen consequences, for international relations. As a historian, I am well aware that the biggest international crises have arisen because of events in the most remote corners of the planet, because of countries which one year previously no one had noticed and about whose existence few people had even known.

As Einstein said 40 years ago, the nuclear age has changed everything but our way of thinking. However, whereas such slowness in comprehending the new realities was to some extent comprehensible 40 years ago, today the stubborn inertness of thinking about the problems of war, peace and security can give rise to no other emotions than consternation and anger.

America has become a country of almost the same religious fundamentalism as Iran. For this reason I shall allow myself to quote holy writ: "Reason is more powerful than the weapons of war, but one sinner can destroy everything." Indeed, in order to destroy the planet today it is enough to have if not one, then two or three sinners near the nuclear buttons....

But we in the Soviet Union do not believe in the inevitability of Armageddon. We believe in the power of human reason, in common sense which makes it possible to understand people's true interests. And this reason is today working more intensely than ever to solve the problem which concerned Einstein--the problem of creating a new way of thinking which is suitable for the realities of the nuclear age and a mutually dependent world.

The key question here, it seems to me, is that of how to ensure the security of state and nation. The traditional method of ensuring it is deterrence of a potential adversary and the creation of a situation of maximum insecurity for him. In the nuclear age, in the age of growing mutual dependence, we must develop an alternative to this approach. A good start was made by the Palme Commission, which put forth the concept of "security for all" in 1982. The essence of this concept is formulated in the commission's report:

"States can no longer strive to strengthen their own security at each other's expense; security can only be achieved through joint efforts."

I want to emphasize that the concept of security for all is shared by us today. This has been confirmed more than once at the highest level of Soviet

leadership. At one time, at the beginning of the 1970's, it seemed that the leaders of the United States had also come close to an understanding of these new realities of the nuclear age. But, alas, this "moment of truth" for U.S. foreign policy proved to be very transient. As it turned out, the present administration's flirtation with the idea of normalizing the international situation, of strengthening peace and of bringing about disarmament also proved to be transient. One gets the impression that so far the ardor of "love" has hardly lasted for one election campaign.

Perhaps the greatest disappointment is experienced when you see that after people have seemed to begin to understand the new imperatives of the contemporary period and to move in the right direction after long periods of groping in the dark and of tortuous trial and error, they have not even waited for the goose to lay the golden eggs but have suddenly cut off its head. I became involved in earnest in Soviet-American relations at the end of 1967, and I have been a witness to, and participant in, many events and debates, experiencing in these years a full circle from "cold war" to detente and back again. For this reason I can use the French expression "deja vu" with full assurance. There were also debates about whether it is possible to achieve a usable military-strategic superiority over the other side. There were also arguments surrounding the offensive nature of antimissile defense systems, which one would have thought had been settled but which were nonetheless resurrected in connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or so-called "star wars."

Something else that seemed to have been settled was the antiquated debate on whether the God-fearing United States can coexist with the socialist Soviet Union, or whether the latter is the "empire of evil" and must be "discarded on the garbage heap of history."

And the point is not even that this return to the past gives rise to bitter feelings about the futility of the tremendous efforts made by both sides to improve our relations and to consolidate international security in general. The main threat lies in the fact that the present aggravation of these relations is occurring at a new, much more dangerous level of development of weapons of destruction in a situation in which the number of potential members of the "nuclear club" is rising rapidly and in which international mutual dependence, capable of drawing an unprecedented number of participants into the maelstrom of a new "cold war," has increased sharply.

There is no task more important now than that of halting and reversing this fatal trend. It is precisely at this that our proposals for improving Soviet-American relations and consolidating international security as a whole are aimed. Many of them have been hushed up, distorted or rejected out of hand in the West, but I am sure that they are still important and therefore still alive.

There is also the idea of the nuclear freeze, without which, I am deeply convinced, we cannot get anywhere, since we cannot shift from the arms race to the reduction of nuclear arms without first stopping--particularly under present conditions, in which technological development in the military sphere is moving faster than ever before, while negotiations, if there are any, are

proceeding at a snail's pace. What keeps us from stopping--call it what you want: a pause, a moratorium, a freeze--for, say, a year? Stopping to look around, to start negotiations in a good atmosphere. The arsenals of "over-kill" are, after all, so great that there is no risk here for anyone.

I will list the proposals made in other initiatives:

The formation of nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, and the discussion of the possibility of imparting nuclear-free status to the Baltic zone;

The USSR pledge not to use nuclear weapons first;

The reduction of conventional forces and arms;

The conclusion of a treaty between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact states on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. Incidentally, this proposal, with which the Warsaw Pact states officially addressed NATO members on 7 May 1984, is, in my opinion, being turned down by the West with no thought of the future. After all, it is basically a question of a serious, mutually advantageous obligation, the adoption of which could rid both sides, and the world as a whole, of existing and potential crises in various regions, whether in Latin America, Asia or Europe.

Just consider this proposal. The Warsaw Pact countries have proposed an agreement between themselves and the NATO countries which would contain the obligation, first, not to use force against other members of their own blocs. This, I must say, confirms the fact that the infamous "Brezhnev doctrine," which has been the subject of so much discussion in the West, is only a myth invented by Western propaganda. All of the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to make firm commitments in this area. Second, it is a pledge not to use force against countries belonging to the other bloc. Finally and thirdly, it is a pledge not to use force against countries belonging to neither bloc. America talks so much about the communist threat and the Soviet threat to Third World countries. This pact would guarantee that such a threat does not exist. There would also be no Afghan question--provided, of course, that there would be no military interference in its affairs in any form by any country, whether the United States, the PRC, Pakistan or, of course, the USSR. The same applies to other regions.

Such an obligation would doubtless help to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of third countries and exclude actions of force by one country that, as a rule, provoke a reaction by the other and then lead to the escalation of conflicts. Such an obligation, contrary to the objections of critics, would by no means be a simple repetition of the UN Charter; in any case it would repeat the charter no more than the charter itself repeats the biblical commandment "Thou shalt not kill," which did not keep it from being signed.

All these proposals and many others remain open to broad and businesslike discussion. I deliberately do not want to go into the nature and subject

matter of the Soviet-American Geneva talks. It would be inappropriate and tactless to do this while they are still in their initial stages. But I would like to say a few words on the political side of the matter.

It is well known that a favorable atmosphere is necessary for progress in any serious negotiations. In this sense, in any case as Moscow sees it, the American side did not make the best use of the time which passed from the moment when Andrey Gromyko and George Shultz met in January this year until the beginning of the Geneva talks. It is difficult to believe in the good-will of the American side at negotiations, if on the eve of their commencement Washington publishes an official document accusing its partner in the forthcoming negotiations of deception and violations of treaty obligations and unleashes a cynical campaign to undermine faith in all agreements--both existing and future ones. It is difficult to believe the sincerity of declared intentions to reduce arms, when the administration simultaneously pushes record military programs through Congress while contriving to use the very fact of the forthcoming negotiations as an additional argument in favor of these programs. And what about the escalation of anti-Soviet, anti-communist hysteria in recent weeks? What is the speech by Secretary of State Shultz in San Francisco worth in this respect? If he has such a low opinion of us, how does he intend to reach an agreement with us on disarmament?

At times it seems as if we are dealing with a vicious circle: Agreements require trust, and trust is best secured by agreements. In actual fact this is only an apparent contradiction and can be removed by a simple formula: If one approaches negotiations in earnest, then one must make every effort to make them successful and to improve the political climate. It is precisely in this context that one should regard the Soviet initiative of 22 February 1985. It is connected with the approach of an important date--the 40th anniversary of our common victory over fascism in World War II. And this link between times is far from accidental--the lessons of those terrible years have the most direct bearing on the present era. At that time, despite the fact that the allies' interests diverged no less than they do now and that our knowledge and understanding of one another were far less, we were nevertheless able to unite in the struggle against the common enemy. Now we are faced with a far more terrible enemy--the threat of a worldwide nuclear catastrophe that can also be eliminated only through joint effort. Our dilemma is extremely simple: We either survive together or die together. An awareness of this fact also dictated the proposal made by the Soviet Government to the U.S. leaders: to jointly confirm, in connection with the anniversary of our common victory, the essence and spirit of the main obligations adopted by both sides both at the end of the war and in the agreements of the 1970's. This would seem to be a good starting point for improving the international situation and the conditions for businesslike, fruitful dialogue between our countries.

We are ready to listen to any other proposals leading to this goal. One thing remains indisputable: In the present situation, the risk of hurting ourselves by taking a step forward is less than the risk of inaction. Too many trends are operating in the opposite, highly dangerous direction, and the stakes are too high, unprecedentedly high.

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1985

## IMPORTANCE OF WW II LEND-LEASE AID TO UK, USSR BELITTLED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 47-53

[Article by G. I. Korotkov: "Lend-Lease: Myths and Reality"]

[Text] In summer 1940, England, which was at war with Hitler's Germany, requested aid from Washington in the form of weapons and materiel. The Anglo-American agreement of 2 September stipulated that the United States would give the English 50 destroyers, 20 torpedo boats, 150 airplanes and 250,000 rifles in exchange for 8 bases in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana and some other English possessions in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>1</sup>

When the Washington administration consented to this agreement, it expected to strengthen its position in the Caribbean basin. In the opinion of President F. Roosevelt, the United States would have a chance to encircle itself with a "steel ring" which "Germany would not be able to break."<sup>2</sup> People in Washington also saw an opportunity to crowd England all the way out of its traditional spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The American destroyers had already been scrapped by the U.S. Navy, but the English needed them to protect convoys in the Atlantic. At the same time, the English side promised to give the Americans documents on discoveries in the field of radar and on the work on the atomic bomb.

At first the English paid for shipments of materiel and weapons with cash, but the English supply of foreign currency and gold was soon depleted. At the end of 1940 W. Churchill frankly admitted that England would soon be incapable of paying America for these shipments.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, by that time the English had still not repaid all of their old war debts and therefore could not, by the terms of American legislation of that time, apply for loans in the United States.

On 17 December 1940 Roosevelt suggested an alternative--something midway between the extension of loans and the transfer of materiel in the form of a "gift." This method of transferring materiel on lease or on loan (lend-lease) was then instituted. On 11 March 1941 the U.S. Congress passed a law on lend-lease, authorizing the President to sell, transfer, exchange, lend,

rent or lease weapons, ammunition, food and any other goods and materials to any state whose defense was of vital importance to the United States.<sup>4</sup>

The President of the United States could extend the terms of the lend-lease act to any state already at war or likely to be at war in the future with the bloc of Axis powers. The law contained no stipulations regarding the solvency of states. Consequently, on the surface lend-lease looked as if the United States were prepared to make economic outlays in order to "save" others. In any case, this is precisely the interpretation most commonly used by American historians.

In reality, the American expenditures indirectly guarded the security of the United States itself against the threat of invasion by an aggressor. Besides this, by leasing or lending equipment, it hoped to put the country receiving this assistance in a position of economic dependence. Lend-lease simultaneously expanded the sphere of influence of American capital. Finally, each country receiving this kind of assistance then assisted the United States in other ways--with services, crude resources, materials, etc. But something else was even more important: The Americans hoped that "after the fascist aggressors had been defeated, the United States would, without losing a single soldier...act as a leader and guide."<sup>5</sup>

This position was described quite precisely by Professor T. Bailey: "We will make England able to fight [with our weapons] to the last English soldier, while we remain neutral and prosper."<sup>6</sup>

American assistance was an important factor, but not the decisive one, deterring Hitler from invading the British Isles. In 1941, for example, England produced (or received from its dominions and colonies) 92 percent of the resources it needed to fight the war.<sup>7</sup>

The lend-lease policy naturally brought the United States and England closer together within the context of the "grand strategy." In January 1941 a coordinated plan for joint U.S.-English action was adopted--"Plan ABC-1," by the terms of which the European theater was called the main theater of war in the fight against the Axis powers, and Hitler's Germany was named the number-one enemy.<sup>8</sup> At that time, however, no one in Washington even considered the possibility of actual participation in the armed struggle in the European theater, with the exception of participation by American ships in the protection of convoys crossing the Atlantic and the use of 20 or 30 American submarines in the Bay of Biscay and the West Mediterranean.

We should recall that after Hitler took France in summer 1940, he hoped to invade the British Isles after conducting his planned "blitzkrieg" against the USSR ("Barbarossa"). Consequently, the threat to England was alleviated even before the English began receiving lend-lease aid. When people in Washington heard about Hitler's project "Barbarossa," F. Roosevelt took a number of steps to expand relations with the USSR. On 21 January 1941 the State Department lifted the "moral embargo" on trade with the USSR. People in Washington realized that a stronger Germany posed a threat to America.<sup>9</sup>

In the atmosphere of the anticipated attack on the USSR by Hitler's Germany, variations of the "new approach" to the Soviet Union, which was still the main force actually capable of resisting fascist aggression, were considered by Washington leaders in winter and spring 1941.

Immediately after fascist Germany invaded the USSR, an American administration statement of 23 June 1941 said that the resistance of Hitler's aggression was in the interests of U.S. defense and security.<sup>10</sup> The same view was expressed in a note to the Soviet ambassador on 2 August 1941.<sup>11</sup> According to Secretary of the Interior H. Ickes, by helping the USSR the United States would "win immeasurable gains with regard to human losses and material expenditures."<sup>12</sup>

The massive public movement in support of the fighting Soviet people was also important. Numerous rallies and meetings were held in the largest American cities for a show of solidarity with the Soviet Union. Various public campaigns were launched to "help Russia." The movement for a second front grew stronger.

It is clear that the extension of lend-lease to the USSR was dictated not only--and not so much--by economic benefits, but also and mainly by considerations of military policy. Since the United States and the Soviet state had a common and highly dangerous enemy, there was no choice--the situation demanded a coalition with the USSR.

On 24 June 1941 President Roosevelt announced the United States' willingness to support the Soviet Union. On 12 July 1941 an agreement was signed in Moscow on joint actions by the governments of the USSR and Great Britain in the war against Germany.<sup>13</sup> Soon afterward Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow as a personal representative of the American President. On 2 August 1941 Soviet and American notes were exchanged on the renewal of the USSR-U.S. trade agreement for another year.<sup>14</sup> That same day S. Wallace, acting secretary of state, informed the Soviet ambassador in the United States that the U.S. Government had "decided to give all possible economic assistance" to the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression. "This decision," the American note said, "was dictated by the U.S. Government's certainty that the reinforcement of the Soviet Union's armed resistance of the aggressor's predatory attack, posing a threat to the security and independence of the Soviet Union and of all other nations, meets the interests of the United States' own defense."<sup>15</sup>

Representatives of the USSR, United States and Great Britain met in Moscow from 29 September to 1 October 1941 to discuss mutual military-economic assistance. An agreement was concluded on military shipments and was recorded in the conference protocol.<sup>16</sup>

The bureaucratic mechanism of arms shipments, however, moved slowly: Washington did not fulfill its obligations by the terms of the Moscow conference protocol. For half a year of war, the Soviet Union did not receive any substantial assistance from the United States. The United States promised to supply it with 900 bombers, 900 fighter planes, 1,125 medium tanks and an equal number of light tanks, 85,000 trucks and other equipment between

1 October 1941 and 30 June 1942. In fact, the Soviet Union received only 267 bombers (29.7 percent of the total), 278 fighters (30.9 percent), 363 medium tanks (32.3 percent), 420 light tanks (37.3 percent) and 16,502 trucks (19.4 percent) in that time.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, these shipments were important at that time, during the most difficult days of the war.

In a note of 2 August from F. Roosevelt to L. Crowley, the official in charge of these shipments, the President said: "It has been almost 6 weeks since the start of the Russian war, and we have done virtually nothing to supply them with the equipment they need."<sup>18</sup> In the opinion of H. Hopkins, even the small negotiated shipments could not reach the USSR before the beginning of winter.<sup>19</sup>

The first year of the Great Patriotic War ended. Significant changes took place on the Soviet-German front. In continuous intense battles, the Red Army dealt the aggressor severe blows, put many of the best enemy motorized and tank divisions out of commission and destroyed large quantities of enemy materiel and munitions. Hitler's plans for a "blitzkrieg" and the myth of the Wehrmacht's "invincibility" were dispelled.

By 1942 Soviet industry was producing over 25,000 planes, over 24,000 tanks and 158,000 guns and mortars.<sup>20</sup>

By the terms of the Soviet-American agreement of 11 June 1942, the United States promised to supply the USSR with strategic materials, and the Soviet Government promised to strengthen U.S. defense by providing the United States with strategic materials, services, privileges and defense information.<sup>21</sup> Even after this agreement had been signed, however, American shipments arrived in the USSR far later and in smaller quantities than anticipated. By the end of 1942 only 55 percent of the shipments stipulated in the second protocol had reached the USSR.

American lend-lease could have been extremely important and valuable to the USSR in 1941 and 1942 if the United States had fulfilled its obligations. This did not happen, and the main reason was that Washington officials were trying to use lend-lease as a political instrument.

Political decisions affected actual behavior. This was reflected first in the sabotage of the second front in Western Europe. When the President of the United States informed I. V. Stalin in June 1943 of the latest postponement of the opening of the second front--this time until 1944--he could not cite any convincing arguments to justify this decision.<sup>23</sup> The Allies complained about a shortage of forces and funds, but these forces and funds did exist. Some Western researchers have quite justifiably called this a deliberate deception.<sup>24</sup>

In 1943 and 1944 relations between the USSR and the Western Allies were also complicated by the unilateral U.S.-English actions to reduce shipments of materiel to northern sea ports in the USSR. Again, the Anglo-American side could not support its actions with any serious arguments. A message of 30 March 1943 informed the Soviet Government that a shortage of transport vehicles would keep the United States and England from meeting previously negotiated volumes of deliveries to the USSR.<sup>25</sup> This was not the truth either:

The vehicles did exist. American researcher I. Spector concluded that "the Red Army had to rely exclusively on Soviet resources until late spring in 1943."<sup>26</sup>

All of this naturally provoked the predictable reaction from the Soviet side. As I. V. Stalin told F. Roosevelt in a letter of 11 June 1943, the postponement of the Anglo-American invasion in Western Europe would "create additional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which has been at war with the main forces of Germany and its satellites for 2 years now, using all of its forces to the utmost, and will put the Soviet Army, which is fighting for its own country and for the Allies, on its own, in a position of virtual hand-to-hand combat with an extremely strong and dangerous enemy."<sup>27</sup>

Several American sources repeat the allegation that American trucks were in the majority among the advancing Soviet forces in the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic region in 1944. It is true that Soviet troops had foreign trucks, but they certainly did not represent the majority. In all, 170,000 American trucks had been delivered to the USSR before 1 January 1944. This represented 19 percent of the Red Army's vehicle pool.<sup>28</sup> The percentage of foreign armored tanks was even lower. On 1 June 1944 the Soviet troops on the front had over 7,700, and the supreme command was keeping another 2,232 tanks and self-propelled gun mounts in reserve. In 1944, however, Soviet industry produced 29,000 tanks and mounts. The USSR received 2,757 tanks and 57 self-propelled guns on lend-lease, or less than 10 percent of the total number of tanks produced in the USSR that same year.<sup>29</sup>

Exaggerating the importance of the lend-lease shipments, bourgeois historians allege that America "fed," "shod" and "clothed" Soviet soldiers. Canned meat came from overseas. It was not bad, but the soldiers nevertheless referred to it ironically as the "second front." Ammunition and boots arrived. As for the main thing, bread, the average annual exports of grain, groats and flour from the United States and from Canada to the USSR represented (calculated in grain units) 2.8 percent of our country's average annual grain procurements during the war years.<sup>30</sup>

Ignoring the facts, and sometimes distorting them flagrantly, some American historians portray the lend-lease shipments as the main reason for the USSR's victory over fascism. For example, T. Bailey wrote that without lend-lease the USSR would either have perished or would have been unable to rout the enemy from its territory for many years.<sup>31</sup> The preface to R. Jones' book "The Roads to Russia" contains the statement that the USSR would have been defeated without the lend-lease shipments. The same view is publicized by J. Infeld in his book "The Poltava Affair." American historian R. Lukas asserted that the USSR survived exclusively as a result of "military assistance from the capitalist powers."<sup>32</sup>

According to American sources, 14,450 planes and around 7,000 tanks were sent from the United States to the USSR during the war.<sup>33</sup> But we must remember, in the first place, that not all of the planes and tanks reached Soviet ports. In the second place, even if we accept these figures, they seem extremely modest in comparison to Soviet military production during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Foreign deliveries to the USSR throughout the war years represented only 4 percent of the output of the Soviet military industry.<sup>34</sup>

Between July 1941 and August 1945 the Soviet Union produced more than 12,139,000 rifles and carbines, more than 6,173,000 submachine guns, more than 1,515,000 machine guns of all types, 482,200 guns of all types and calibers, 351,800 mortars, 102,800 tanks and self-propelled gun mounts and 112,100 combat planes.<sup>35</sup>

Another myth circulated by American historians concerns the quality of the military equipment delivered to the USSR during the war years. However, the weapons and materiel delivered by the Americans was not always of the highest quality. An analysis indicated that Soviet airborne units equipped with American planes suffered heavier losses in battle than units with Soviet planes. The planes delivered to the USSR were obsolete models and were technically inferior to the latest Soviet fighters and attack planes.

People in Washington are still implying that lend-lease was a "one-way street." The Department of Commerce reported after the end of the war that the United States received 300,000 tons of chromium ore, 32,000 tons of manganese ore, gold, furs and large quantities of other valuable raw materials from the USSR.<sup>36</sup> "Deliveries from the USSR," J. Jones, U.S. secretary of commerce from 1940 to 1944, admitted, "not only returned our investment but also produced a profit, which was far from a frequent case in the trade relations regulated by our government agencies."<sup>37</sup> Historian G. Herring remarked: "Lend-lease was not the most selfless act in human history.... This was an act of calculated egotism, and the Americans were always aware of the benefits they could derive from it."<sup>38</sup> According to statistics cited in J. Donovan's book "The Militarism of the USA," American industry produced 297,000 airplanes, 86,000 tanks and 315,000 guns and mortars between 1939 and 1945.<sup>39</sup> Only a negligible portion of this huge quantity of weapons and materiel was sent to the Soviet Union: In particular, the airplanes sent represented only 5 percent of the total number produced in the United States.

At the same time, it is significant that the cooperation between the United States and the USSR during the war was a unique example of relations between two states with opposite social systems. The possibility of cooperation was demonstrated in practice.

As for lend-lease accounts, after the end of the war the United States asked the USSR for 1.3 billion dollars in payment for lend-lease shipments not used during the war. The negotiations of 1947 and 1960 did not settle the matter. The obstacle was the entire trade policy of the U.S. Government, which was aimed at undermining economic relations with the Soviet Union.

Soviet-U.S. talks on lend-lease were later held again in October 1972. The American side's reconsideration of its trade policy and the progress made in the discussion of the principles of the new trade agreement between the USSR and the United States changed the situation. An opportunity arose for a comprehensive approach to the problem and for the necessary coordination of lend-lease accounts with trade, economic and financial cooperation between the two sides. The United States set the compensation figure at 800 million dollars and agreed that payments should start after the USSR had been granted most-favored-nation status in trade. However, the Soviet Union has still not been granted this status.<sup>40</sup>

Soviet historians have not ignored lend-lease. There is a complete description of this assistance in, for example, the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945 gg." [The History of World War II, 1939-1945], the recently published "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [A Brief History of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] and other publications. The Soviet people remember lend-lease and are grateful to the American people and government for the assistance rendered in these difficult years for the USSR. However, the attempts of some bourgeois authors to portray the system of lend-lease shipments as "philanthropy" or "magnanimity" do not agree with the facts. Monopolies and ruling circles in the United States "used economic contacts and resources (trade, loans and lend-lease shipments) to strengthen their influence in the world, 'materialize' their interference in the affairs of other countries and attach the economies of states in Europe, Asia and Latin America to the interests of the American economy."<sup>41</sup>

It is also noteworthy that a realistic assessment of lend-lease was characteristic of sensible U.S. politicians during World War II. For example, H. Hopkins stressed: "We never believed that our lend-lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the eastern front. The victory was won with the heroism and blood of the Russian Army."<sup>42</sup> The same approach is found in some works by Western researchers published after the war. Historian H. Commager wrote in 1945 that "today the most important material element in the war is the Russian soldier."<sup>43</sup>

The Soviet Union's contribution to the defeat of the fascist aggressor played a decisive role. It was precisely on the Soviet-German front that the main forces of Hitler's Germany were smashed and annihilated under the crushing blows of the USSR Armed Forces, equipped primarily with Soviet materiel.

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## ESCALATION OF FRICTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 54-59

[Article by P. G. Litavrin]

[Text] Ronald Reagan's re-election led to a tougher U.S. policy in Central America. And this is no coincidence. The Reagan Administration now has less need to consider the reactions of voters or to put on a peaceable face. The White House's militarist line in this region can now be displayed in an undisguised form. The latest anti-Nicaraguan campaign, connected with the alleged deliveries of Soviet MIG airplanes to Nicaragua, had already been launched by the end of 1984. State Department officials made threatening remarks about the U.S. willingness to deliver strikes against "military targets" in Nicaragua. American reconnaissance planes began to regularly invade the air space of the republic, and large U.S. naval forces were concentrated near its coastline. When this lie was exposed, Washington tried to use the Sandinist leadership's efforts to enhance the republic's defensive potential as a pretext for new slanderous attacks on Nicaragua--this time accusing it of "an intention to attack its neighbors."

Refuting these lies, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister M. D'Escoto called them the ravings of a lunatic, because every unprejudiced person knows that any military action by Nicaragua against a neighbor would serve the United States as a long-awaited pretext for direct armed aggression against the republic. In an attempt to relax tension, the Sandinist government proposed at the end of November 1984 that D. Ortega, who had been elected president of the republic, meet with R. Reagan to settle disputes.

Washington, however, did not respond to this proposal. Furthermore, in January 1985 the United States unilaterally broke off the talks it had been conducting with Nicaragua for over half a year.

Continuing his efforts to escalate tension in Central America, Reagan addressed parliamentarians from the countries of the Western Hemisphere in the White House in January 1985, informing them of his "conceptual" view of democracy. The President informed them of the policy Washington intended to pursue in its relations with its southern neighbors. In this speech, he repeated the frequently voiced statement, so familiar to Latin Americans,

about "helping our friends defend themselves against subversive activity organized with the support of the Soviet bloc, Cuba and Nicaragua." What is more, the President cited an odd argument to justify, in his opinion, the undeclared war against Nicaragua. He called it "an act of self-defense, not contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter and OAS Charter on individual and collective security."

Reagan gave special attention to aid to Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries when he addressed a joint session of both houses of Congress with his traditional annual State of the Union message.

In February 1985 the Washington administration issued its latest "white paper" on the situation in Central America. In the foreword, Pentagon Chief C. Weinberger repeated the statements about the alleged external factors aggravating the problems faced by Central American countries and the growing national liberation movement there. The American mass media did not conceal the fact that the issuance of the "white paper" was timed to coincide with the beginning of congressional discussions of the administration's request for 1.1 billion dollars in military-economic aid to pro-American regimes in the region.

To reinforce its threats, the United States conducted joint maneuvers with Honduras in February-April 1985 in direct proximity to the Nicaraguan coast, the "Big Pine-3" maneuvers involving tanks and armored vehicles, followed by the "Universal Trek-85" maneuvers.

Two objectives lie at the basis of the Reagan Administration's current bellicose approach to Central America. First of all, and this has already been pointed out by Soviet researchers,\* Reagan's policy in Central America is based on the assumption that the revolutionary liberation movement there was "inspired by Cuba and the USSR" and that this is supposedly what led to the destabilization of this region of such strategic importance to the United States. This is why attempts are being made to portray Central America as an arena of East-West confrontation, where the United States, in the words of former Secretary of State A. Haig, must "stop the communist advance." In the second place, the underlying basis of the Reagan Administration's approach to Central America, as recorded in works by renowned political analysts J. Kirkpatrick and S. Huntington, consists in the belief that although dictatorial repressive regimes in Latin America and other developing countries violate elementary human rights, they are preferable to leftist governments because they could "evolve in the direction needed by the United States." It is understandable that the authors of this theory say nothing about the real reasons for this preference: The reactionary dictatorships have always been the most reliable defenders of the interests of American monopolies and have displayed a maximum of zeal in the struggle against revolutionary liberation movements. The emphasis on their ability to "evolve" is supposed to justify U.S. military and economic aid to dictatorships in the eyes of the public,

\* See, for example, A. V. Kuzmishchev, "The Escalation of U.S. Intervention in Central America," *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA*, 1983, No 7, pp 7-19; A. N. Glinkin, "U.S. Imperialism's Current Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean," *ibid.*, 1984, No 6, pp 16-28.

because American cooperation with them is supposedly leading to their "liberalization." At the same time, Nicaragua is called a "Marxist dictatorship," which, according to this "theory," has always suppressed and will always suppress democracy, and for this reason the United States has no other choice but to launch an armed struggle against it.

In 1983 and 1984 the United States started an undeclared war against Nicaragua with 18,000 counterrevolutionaries based in Honduras and Costa Rica. Plans for an invasion were drawn up in Washington. The establishment of an infrastructure for aggression--roads, airfields and bases--was completed in Honduras. Nicaraguan ports were mined. Regular raids, involving U.S. citizens, were made on the territory of Nicaragua.

Of course, all of this put Nicaragua in a difficult position. Its foreign debt exceeded 4 billion dollars at the end of 1984. As a result of the hostile actions of the United States and the counterrevolutionaries, the Sandinist government had to spend more than 40 percent of the national budget on defense needs.

The policy of the Reagan Administration has aroused dissatisfaction and indignation in the world, even among the European allies, which have tried to maintain good relations with Nicaragua and are giving it economic and food assistance. Disagreement with the exertion of brutal pressure on the Sandinists has been expressed in the American Congress and in political circles. On the one hand, there has been criticism of the illegality of the behavior of the Reagan Administration, which is obviously trying to destabilize the situation in a state with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations. On the other, the effectiveness of this overt and forcible pressure on Nicaragua is being questioned. As speakers remarked during hearings in the 98th Congress, threats and unconcealed hostility "will lead only to the further radicalization of the revolutionary process."

After the Congress stopped allocating funds for covert CIA operations against Nicaragua and demanded the cessation of the mining of ports, the administration started to use private sources to support the "contras." In 1984 a "civilian aid to the military" group was formed in the United States to finance the counterrevolutionaries. The recent deaths of U.S. citizens in Central America have also complicated the situation for the administration. Two were killed during a raid on Nicaragua, and another four died when a plane was shot down after it fired at rebels in El Salvador. Then a scandal broke out in the United States over a CIA brochure containing instructions on subversive activity against Nicaragua, including political assassinations, the kidnapping of officials and the destruction of military and civilian establishments. Even Chairman E. Boland (Democrat, Massachusetts) of the House Select Committee on Intelligence said that this "textbook" was "disgusting for a country condemning such actions when they are committed by others."

Although the Reagan Administration agreed to negotiate directly with Nicaragua on the level of deputy foreign ministers, the few rounds of talks between June 1984 and January 1985 proved that the U.S. leadership was trying

to force Sandinist concessions. When these attempts proved futile, Washington broke off the talks. Besides this, during the last campaign the Reagan Administration deliberately used the very existence of political contacts with Nicaragua on a high level as a trump-card against critics of administration policy.

As a result of the elections of 4 November 1984 (to the presidency and the National Assembly), the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) won a two-thirds majority of the vote and demonstrated the widespread support it enjoys. In the opinion of objective foreign observers, these were the first free elections in the country's history. The United States called them "undemocratic" and continued to give generous support to counterrevolutionaries and to repressive regimes in Latin America, including the Pinochet dictatorship, which, according to the "theory" of J. Kirkpatrick and S. Huntington, was supposed to have been "liberalized" but somehow was not.

Hoping to solve the problem with force, the United States chose to interfere openly in the internal affairs of countries of the region and to ship more weapons to Central American dictatorships. It has sent them more weapons in the past 3 years than in the preceding 3 decades, not counting funds for "covert assistance" and subversive operations. Between 1981 and 1984 the Salvadoran Army grew from 15,000 soldiers to 40,000, and punitive expeditions, during which more than 50,000 Salvadorans have already died, were stepped up. None of this, however, has led to any substantial successes, much less a victory over the rebels.

When the policy of military force in Central America began to misfire, the American leadership had to make adjustments and begin using economic and political manipulation.

In 1984 the U.S. administration began to actively promote elections to strengthen the domestic and international positions of dependent regimes, as well as talks between the government of El Salvador and patriotic forces.

The U.S. support of the idea of elections and talks was also needed by the Republicans for domestic political reasons. Above all, it was dictated by the congressional stipulation that military aid to El Salvador would be conditional upon constant progress in the sphere of "human rights."

The "elections" held in an atmosphere of terror in El Salvador were of little real "value." The winner was Washington's protege N. Duarte, who had already been president of the country. According to Washington, the refusal of leftist forces to participate in the election farce was motivated by their "reluctance" to take part in legal elections and their "inclination toward terrorism." As the NEW REPUBLIC correctly pointed out, however, "participation by leftists in the elections in El Salvador would have been literally and figuratively suicidal. Literally, because campaigning would have been tantamount to death for them...and figuratively, because the U.S. Government would never have allowed them to win."

In fall 1984, however, some of the prerequisites for a political settlement in El Salvador were established when talks between patriotic forces and the Duarte government were instituted for the first time after a long interval.

The first round, in the middle of October 1984, marked the beginning of a political dialogue, but it is common knowledge that a huge gap still exists between the two sides. At these talks the rebels put forth a sweeping program of democratic demands. In spite of Duarte's efforts to involve the National Liberation Front in the election farce, the rebels put forth a plan for a sequential settlement in the country. This plan includes a cease-fire, the cessation of outside interference in Salvadoran affairs, the adoption of a new constitution, the creation of a government of national conciliation and the reorganization of the army.

The talks have not produced any concrete results as yet. Government troops launched an offensive immediately after this round. Patriotic forces responded by stepping up their operations.

At the end of 1984 conditions were also established for a broader political settlement in Central America, connected with the signing of the so-called "Act of Peace"--a special document drawn up on 7 September 1984 by the countries of the Contadora Group.\* The "Act of Peace" envisages elections in the Central American states, the dismantling of foreign military bases on their territory, the prohibition of subversive activity against neighbors, the renunciation of the use of force and threats of force, the reduction and subsequent removal of foreign military advisers, the mutual exchange of data on numbers of armed forces, advance information about maneuvers, etc.

For a long time the Reagan Administration maintained that Nicaragua's consent to sign this document was the main condition for a settlement in Central America. But when Nicaragua unconditionally agreed to sign the act on 21 September 1984, the U.S. leadership, which obviously had not expected this turn of events, announced that the document needed amendments and "improvements." Washington demanded a stronger mechanism for the control and regulation of the procedure of fulfilling obligations, a stricter schedule for the removal of foreign military advisers and a more precise definition of "free elections." The Reagan Administration exerted pressure on El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras to convince them of the need for "some amendments... to bring the act in line with U.S. interests in this region." A classified National Security Council document contained the cynical remark that the United States had been able to effectively block the efforts of the Contadora Group and impose the second draft of the revised "Act of Peace" on the countries of the region.

In January 1985, G. Schlaudeman, special representative of the U.S. President in Central America, visited El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica to discuss the situation in the region and the possibility of broader American assistance. In fiscal year 1984 Honduras was already receiving 77.5 million dollars from the United States just for military needs, and it is now hoping for more hand-outs.

In general, the establishment of real prerequisites for the normalization of the situation in Central America, the increasing opposition in the United

\* For a discussion of the Contadora Group's proposals, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 3, pp 5-6; No 6, p 26.

States to involvement in the war against Nicaragua and the futility of the Reagan Administration's attempts to exert military pressure on Managua have escalated friction and disagreements in the American leadership regarding the appropriate policy in Central America. These disagreements, however, do not appear to be connected with the fundamentals of American policy toward Sandinist Nicaragua, the existence of which is viewed as an intolerable situation by the current American leadership, but are largely concerned only with the means and methods of struggle against the Sandinists.

In general terms, there are two main positions on the matter in American ruling circles. The supporters of the first point of view (they include Secretary of State G. Shultz and National Security Adviser R. McFarlane) believe that the policy of forcible pressure on Nicaragua in recent years has produced definite results, that the Reagan Administration has been able to seriously complicate economic and political conditions in the republic and strengthen the position of U.S. allies and, consequently, that this policy should be continued.

According to many experts and politicians, however, this policy cannot aid in solving the socioeconomic problems of the region and, what is most important, "cannot bring about the overthrow of the Sandinists," P. Gleijeses, a renowned expert on Latin America, wrote in FOREIGN POLICY, "without bloody American intervention on a broad scale."

In the opinion of the members of the other, more reactionary group, the main and final attack on Sandinists in Nicaragua should be conducted by American forces (as in Grenada), which would guarantee "success" and would serve as a political demonstration and a unique lesson for other countries.

It must be said that these people are not openly advocating immediate and broad-scale intervention by American troops in Nicaragua because they are aware of the colossal political cost and the serious military and financial losses. They do believe, however, that it is essential to intensify military pressure on Nicaragua to the point of bombing "military installations and shelling the coastline," break off diplomatic relations with the FSLN government, recall American citizens (around 5,000 Americans live in Nicaragua), recognize a group of Somozists as the legal government and give this group a firm footing in the republic by means of active military and economic assistance.

The position of the Congress as a whole, and particularly of the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, is still an important factor deterring aggressive tendencies in U.S. administration policy toward Nicaragua. The majority of the members of the new Congress are not happy about the allocation of funds for Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries and the signs of the American leadership's increasing involvement in attempts to overthrow the Sandinist government by force. In January 1985 the administration took steps to change the attitude of individual congressmen by spreading rumors about Nicaragua's "military expansion," about the "huge shipments of Soviet arms" to this country and about its role as a Soviet-Cuban military base.

In his speech of 22 February 1985, Secretary of State G. Shultz not only brutally attacked Nicaragua but also threatened that the administration might resort to the use of military force if Congress should refuse to allocate the requested sum.

Furthermore, Washington actually rejected the peaceful initiatives put forth by Nicaragua and Cuba at the end of February 1985.

In February-March 1985 the administration began to exert strong pressure on the members of Congress for the allocation of 14 million dollars to finance the "contras" and continue the covert war against Nicaragua. Although this is a small sum, the reaction of the legislators to the administration's request would serve as an indicator of their attitude toward the White House's secret war against the Sandinists and would affect its future financing, and for this reason the ensuing disagreements were of fundamental importance. On 22 April 1985 the House of Representatives turned down the administration's request by a significant majority (248 against 185). This was a serious defeat for the Reagan Administration.

On 1 May Ronald Reagan issued a presidential directive to impose economic and trade sanctions on Nicaragua. THE NEW YORK TIMES called this action a "violation of international law, and perhaps of American law as well."

Therefore, at the beginning of Reagan's second term, his administration tried to react to new developments in Central America with a harder line, but the current situation in the region proves that the people of the Central American countries do not want to put up with any more brutal and flagrant interference in their affairs by U.S. imperialism. The new defeats suffered by Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, the lack of progress in the talks in El Salvador, the more active efforts of the Contadora Group and the new congressional restrictions on aid to the "contras" might put the administration in a situation in which it will have to take real steps toward a political settlement in Central America.

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## ANZUS AND THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 59-63

[Article by V. S. Anichkina]

[Text] This summer the New Zealand Parliament intends to secure, by means of legislation, the government policy of prohibiting military ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand ports. Prime Minister David Lange announced this position almost immediately after the Labour Party election victory in July 1984. It was totally consistent with campaign promises.

People in Washington, however, apparently interpreted the statement only as a declaration, or as "rhetoric," as American politicians like to say. And when the time came for the latest annual maneuvers of ANZUS\*--the military bloc created by the United States in 1951 to secure American strategic interests in the South Pacific--Washington officially requested New Zealand on 21 January 1985 for permission to send the destroyer "Buchanan," capable of carrying nuclear weapons, to its territorial waters. Wellington officially denied this request, citing the previously announced government position.

The United States had a fierce reaction to the denial. It informed New Zealand that its position was "incompatible" with the obligations of an ANZUS member. To exert pressure on the New Zealand Government to force it to reconsider its decision, people in Washington threatened it with exclusion from the bloc, saying that New Zealand would then be powerless against the "external threat."

But all of the threats are not imaginary, for real ones have been emanating from Washington. Pentagon chief C. Weinberger called Wellington's refusal to allow entry to the destroyer "Buchanan" a "serious attack on the ANZUS alliance." Senator W. Cohen (Republican, Maine) demanded the imposition of economic sanctions and introduced a draft resolution on the punishment of this disobedient ally in the Senate a week later, proposing the non-renewal of the trade agreement granting New Zealand most-favored-nation status.

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\* The name is taken from the initials of the three countries making up the bloc—Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

New Zealand, however, remained firm, despite the fact that the American sanctions would seriously injure its economy. Washington's unceremonious pressure did more than restrict its sovereignty and offend its national pride. The most important result was the realization by the government and the people of this country of the serious danger posed by the constant buildup of the nuclear arsenal the United States is deploying throughout the world. They had seen Western Europe become a nuclear hostage of the American military establishment. It was also intimidated constantly with references to the "external threat," and as a result it is now endangered by a nuclear threat from within.

Australia also tried to get rid of the nuclear weapons on its territory and to simultaneously relieve itself of the obligation to participate in U.S. military preparations 2 years ago.

In summer 1983 the new prime minister of Australia, Robert Hawke, the leader of the victorious Labour Party, announced that his government would reconsider the issue of military cooperation with Washington, which was evoking Australian public protests. In particular, he wanted to cancel a promise made by his predecessor, Liberal M. Fraser, offering the United States permanent bases for American warships in the Indian Ocean. He also objected to the entry of Australian ports by American ships carrying nuclear weapons.

People in Washington were alarmed by this and resorted to pressure, which was effective for some time. Until just recently, Australia has been a loyal strategic ally of the United States in this part of the world: In 1951 it joined ANZUS, in 1954 it obediently joined another aggressive bloc created under U.S. auspices, SEATO (which ingloriously ceased to exist in 1977), and in 1962 it signed an agreement with the United States on military cooperation, as a result of which American military bases and other installations began to built on Australian land. In April 1965 R. Menzies, who was then the leader of the Liberal-Country coalition government, announced his cabinet's decision to send Australian troops to Vietnam to aid the Saigon regime. G. Holt, who succeeded Menzies as prime minister in 1966, immediately went to Washington, as his predecessor had for 16 years, and declared upon his return that he would "follow Lyndon Johnson's lead in all areas" in foreign policy. The next two prime ministers did not break the tradition of traveling overseas to "synchronize" the Australian foreign policy line with the American one. Fraser set something of a record by going to Washington twice just in 1980, and he wholeheartedly supported the U.S. line of escalating international tension and aggravating relations with the Soviet Union, a line adopted during J. Carter's last year in the White House.

Canberra's close military cooperation with the United States resulted in the establishment of 20 American military bases on Australian territory by the end of 1980, including the North West Cape base, which the Pentagon, according to a report in the AUSTRALIAN newspaper on 25 July 1983, is using as a communication and command station for its nuclear submarines and for the guidance of missiles launched from them (furthermore, the Australian Government does not even have to be informed of the targets of nuclear missiles launched from its territory); the aerospace center in Pine Gap, in central

Australia, with equipment for the long-distance tracking of missile launches; the "joint" American-Australian base in Narrangar (southern Australia), equipped for B-52 heavy strategic bombers. In the 1980's the United States received permission to station American aircraft carriers on the Australian naval base in Cockburn Sound, and to use the air force base in Darwin for stopovers by B-52 planes on their way to the Indian Ocean. At the very end of his term in office, Fraser promised Washington the use of Australian air bases for the observation of MX missile tests. All of this was summed up by U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT on 20 June 1983: "American installations of vital importance to American defense are located in Australia."

It is therefore not surprising that the mere statement by R. Hawke that the government intended to reassess Australian-American military ties in 1983 caused alarm in Washington. At the next annual session of the ANZUS council on 18 and 19 July in Washington, for the first time in the bloc's more than 30-year existence the council members reviewed the military provisions of the treaty on the alliance and learned that the United States did not guarantee its allies any kind of defense. The published communique specifically said: "The ANZUS treaty does not relieve the governments of each of these countries of the main responsibility for doing everything within their power to safeguard their own security."

Australian Foreign Minister W. Hayden commented on this communique at a press conference, stating that ANZUS does not obligate its members to give one another military assistance. But a U.S. State Department spokesman argued that this applies only to small-scale conflicts. In a large-scale armed attack on one of the allies, assistance must be rendered on request.

In other words, as a correspondent for Melbourne's ACE newspaper said about this exchange of views, "everything will depend on who requests the military support--the lion (the United States) or the mouse (Australia). Any armed conflict in which only Australia is involved will be mouse-sized, or 'small-scale,' from the standpoint of the United States (if Australia should be attacked by, for example, Indonesia). But if the United States should launch some kind of venture against the Soviet Union and its friends, this will be a large-scale conflict, and for this reason, in the United States' opinion, Australia will be obligated to take part in it. In short, the ANZUS treaty only imposes military obligations to the United States on Australia, but gives it no guarantees of its own security." The AUSTRALIAN expressed approximately the same view of the results of the ANZUS Council session: "Whereas our participation on the United States' side is essentially automatic, our partner has refused to give us any kind of reciprocal guarantees."

Now that New Zealand will not allow American warships capable of carrying nuclear weapons to enter its ports, Washington has dragged out the old discredited allegations that it is leaving itself open to the "external threat."

New Zealand believes that the presence of American warships carrying nuclear munitions near its shores represents a real threat. The government's position was supported by the majority of the population. Prime Minister Lange's office reported that it received more than a thousand letters and telegrams each day

on the question of the entry of New Zealand ports by American ships, and 95 percent expressed approval of the government's position.

As a result, Washington declined to participate in the ANZUS bloc's "Sea Eagle-85" naval maneuvers, and they were cancelled.

It is indicative that the Australians, as the SIDNEY MORNING HERALD reported, "were delighted with the New Zealanders' resolute unanimity." The Australian Government became the target of strong public pressure, demanding the fulfillment of campaign promises regarding the reassessment of military cooperation with the Pentagon. "People for Nuclear Disarmament," an Australian nationwide organization, appealed for a refusal to participate in U.S. nuclear preparations. The strength of anti-nuclear feelings in Australia is attested to by the fact that the recently founded Nuclear Disarmament Party won a seat in the Senate (from western Australia) in an election at the end of last year. The Australian Democratic Party, on whose support the ruling Labour Party relies, has five seats in the Senate and has also taken a resolute anti-nuclear stand.

With a view to these feelings, the Australian prime minister informed Secretary of State G. Shultz during his visit to Washington in the beginning of February 1985 that Australia would not allow the use of airfields by American planes for the observance of MX missile tests (the Pentagon plans to conduct these tests at the end of this year, using targets in a zone near the fifth continent).

All of this dealt a severe blow to the ANZUS bloc. A WASHINGTON POST editorial of 24 January said: "Of course, the United States could close its eyes to all of this, pretend that the Labour Party's election victory is a bad dream and wait for changes in New Zealand policy.... But an alliance worthy of the name only in trouble-free years should not be called an alliance at all."

However, when some journalists at a press conference in Washington after the end of the American-Australian talks asked whether the U.S. administration felt that the ANZUS bloc had ceased to exist, a State Department spokesman answered categorically in the negative. "Although New Zealand's decision has severely hurt the alliance," he said, "we will still maintain extremely close relations with Australia, our most active ANZUS partner." It must be said that although Washington officials reacted so fiercely to New Zealand's step, they tried to understate the importance of Australia's refusal to aid in the MX missile tests. G. Shultz was obviously trying to soften the impact of Canberra's demarche when he said that "the United States has decided to test the MX without Australia's help."

It was not convenient for the United States to exaggerate the conflict in the ANZUS alliance at a time when it has to deal with difficulties in another military alliance, NATO. The general public of Belgium and the Netherlands is demanding that their governments renounce their obligation to deploy American cruise missiles.

As WASHINGTON POST correspondent J. Goshko wrote on 7 February, the United States is afraid that the example set by New Zealand might intensify the

movement in Japan for the same kind of ban. The Japanese public and several officials from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have long objected to the country's involvement in U.S. military-strategic plans, and especially to the deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory.

Many Western newspapers have commented on the Reagan Administration's worries about the possible effect of the example set by New Zealand and Australia on other U.S. allies. France's LE MONDE, for example, stressed that "the U.S. State Department addressed extremely serious warnings to allies attempting to give up security commitments." THE NEW YORK TIMES expressed worries about Prime Minister D. Lange's acceptance of the British anti-nuclear movement's invitation to participate in debates on the topic "There Is No Moral Justification for the Western Nuclear Alliance."

The anti-nuclear movement is constantly growing stronger, and this fact must be taken into account by the members of the ANZUS Council when they meet for the 34th council session in July 1985.

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## PERSONNEL CHANGES IN REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 63-68

[Article by T. Z. Dzhaparidze]

[Text] At the beginning of this year the latest series of resignations, transfers and new appointments were the subject of lively discussion in official Washington circles. These were changes in key elements (the White House staff and the Department of the Treasury) and relatively peripheral areas (the departments of the interior,<sup>1</sup> energy and education) of the executive branch of government.

Obviously, there are always personnel changes at the beginning of any presidential term, and this term was no exception. What changes has Ronald Reagan made in the alignment of official personnel and how have political observers assessed these changes?

It is believed that the main reason for personnel changes of this kind is the desire of the chief executive to make adjustments in the planning or implementation of his policy line. It is also assumed that "transfusions of new blood" and structural changes, to the point of the reorganization of certain agencies, lead to definite changes in the content of presidential undertakings during their implementation. Finally, the influence of the personal factor cannot be ignored either: Constant friction and conflicts among the many political appointees also provide reasons for resignations, transfers and the appearance of new faces among the President's closest advisers.

It is true that the U.S. press tends to overdramatize the friction and conflicts between individuals and agencies, portraying them as a sign of "democratic pluralism." Therefore, the importance of these confrontations should not be exaggerated. Furthermore, these conflicts generally occur only during the initial stages of the decisionmaking process; final decisions are the result of compromises and are of a primarily pragmatic and transitory nature. The conflicts mainly reflect the struggle for influence and for access to the chief executive, and not essentially diverging political views.

But there are also some more mundane and more objective reasons for these personnel changes: for example, when a cabinet member or head of an executive

department defends the interests of his own agency too zealously, without considering the wishes of the entire team and its individual members. In these cases, the individual could become a persona non grata in the White House, and he would either be dismissed or given a different job. There is also the factor of political corruption. Various financial manipulations and the use of official positions for selfish purposes, in which political appointees are often implicated, can hurt the prestige of the White House and therefore also result in personnel changes. Each of these factors (alone or in various combinations) has had an impact on the recent changes in Washington.

And we could make another general statement. American political analysts are of the firm belief that the President of the United States gradually loses influence and exhausts his political resources during his second term--and ever more quickly as the end of this term approaches. They say that a chief executive serving a second term can actually use only the first 2 years of the 4 allotted to him by the Constitution to carry out his plans successfully (particularly in the sphere of domestic policy). These are the 2 years until the midterm congressional elections, which are followed by the start of the next presidential campaign. This is why the President usually tries to keep the experienced members of his old team in key positions (an intention Reagan announced, incidentally, at the very first cabinet meeting in early November 1984).

The American political vocabulary even includes the term "lame duck." This is the name given to a President nearing the end of his term in office, a President who cannot count on constructive relations with his main partner, Congress, because the legislators are either preoccupied with their own race for re-election or are testing the waters for a close relationship with new individuals--the probable presidential candidates of their parties.

It is against this background that the recent changes in the Reagan Administration should be examined.

The official resignations of W. Clark and M. Deaver, two men who had been with the chief executive since the beginning of his political career and who were considered to be two of the people closest to him, were the first topics of lively discussion.

The departure of W. Clark (who was first the deputy secretary of state in the administration, then the President's national security adviser and then the head of the Department of the Interior in 1983 and 1984) came as a surprise to many political observers. Clark, who was considered to be Reagan's "eyes and ears," was expected to occupy one of the leading positions in the White House.<sup>2</sup> As for the resignation of M. Deaver, the deputy of Chief of White House Staff J. Baker, it signaled, in combination with Councillor E. Meese's appointment as attorney general and J. Baker's appointment as secretary of the treasury, the final collapse of the "power triumvirate" which was supposed to have been instrumental in Reagan's legislative victories of 1981-1984 and helped to preserve the unity, at least externally, of the President's closest advisers. Deaver maintained an extremely close personal relationship with the chief executive and his wife.

Officially, the two resignations followed the customary pattern: Both Clark and Deaver announced the "completion of their mission and their desire to return to the private sector." Reagan made the proper response by expressing his "sincere regrets" in connection with the departure of administration members he "deeply trusted." According to the unanimous opinion of observers, however, the resignations of the two high-level administration officials were obviously made necessary by serious friction and disagreements among the President's advisers.

As we know, as soon as the President decided to appoint E. Meese attorney general,<sup>3</sup> members of the extreme right wing of the Republican Party made a much more vigorous effort to find an appropriate replacement for their representative in the White House. The extreme Right, the main pillar of the President's political coalition, had some doubts about J. Baker, R. Darman and R. McFarlane and had an unhealthy reaction to the growth of their influence; they wanted to correct the situation caused by Meese's departure by promoting new advocates of the "hard line" to the White House. At first, W. Clark and J. Kirkpatrick were named among the most acceptable candidates. The transfer of the first to the office of secretary of the interior was regarded as a temporary development by members of the extreme Right, who hoped to see W. Clark eventually head the White House staff. As for J. Kirkpatrick, two offices were considered to be the most suitable for her-political adviser to the President or chief of the National Security Council staff. Within the administration, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and Director W. Caney of the CIA zealously promoted the advancement of W. Clark and J. Kirkpatrick.

Deaver hoped to replace J. Baker if the latter should move from the White House to a high cabinet position, and he won the support of the President's wife, Nancy Reagan, in these efforts. There was also increasing personal friction between W. Clark and M. Deaver, apparently due to each man's attempts to appear "even more" loyal and faithful to the President. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Deaver and Clark were "preoccupied" with their mutual conflicts. Nevertheless, M. Deaver used his White House position, not without Nancy Reagan's help, to influence the President and to contribute to Clark's "fall from grace"; the latter had no choice but to resign and "go back to his ranch in California."

But then Deaver also resigned. He had been expressing his wish to do so for a long time, and he learned in a confidential talk with Nancy Reagan that he could not count on advancement in the White House. Reports were leaked to the mass media that Burson-Marsteller, a large advertising firm, had offered Deaver an executive position in its Washington agency with an annual salary of 200,000 dollars.

As soon as Deaver had resigned, THE WASHINGTON POST published an article containing specific references to several cases in which Deaver's behavior "bordered" on improper conduct. For example, he received a loan of 50,000 dollars with the help of a man named J. McKean, who was then made the chairman of the board of trustees of the U.S. Postal Service in exchange. In addition, journalists did not ignore the sizeable fee Deaver received for a book about nutrition, although there was some question as to whether he had actually

written it, etc. K. Deaver, M. Deaver's wife, displayed at least as much business "acumen." After accepting a job with Mary Pettus Associates, a small advertising firm in Washington, with an annual salary of 60,000 dollars in 1982, she used her White House contacts to secure influential clients for the firm, including the Republican Party National Committee. This was plain and simply influence-peddling--bordering on illegality or crossing the line altogether.

A failure also lay ahead for Jeane Kirkpatrick, the protege of the extreme Right who had represented the United States in the United Nations. Judging by reports in the press, she wanted to be the President's national security adviser. Her move to the White House was opposed vehemently by Secretary of State G. Shultz and high-level NSC staffers. The protracted haggling by the President and J. Kirkpatrick over a suitable position ended with the announcement of her resignation. V. Walters became the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations with cabinet status.<sup>4</sup>

A switch of positions was organized for J. Baker and former Secretary of the Treasury D. Regan, one of the President's oldest and closest friends. Regan's appointment as White House chief of staff is related to the new functions this link of the power structure is now expected to perform. In the previous 4 years its main function was to guarantee the re-election of the President, but now the efforts of all subdivisions and staff members of the central link of the machinery of presidential power will be redirected toward the realization of Reagan's ambitious plans to occupy "a fitting place in the history of his nation."

A strong person was needed to implement a single coordinated policy for the White House staff, which had previously experienced the contradictory influence of three chiefs. Regan is distinguished by "absolute loyalty" to the President. He is expected to manage the staff with the administrative style characteristic of Merrill Lynch, the largest brokerage, where Regan was chairman of the board of directors--in short, the efficient Wall Street style. As THE WASHINGTON POST commented in this connection, Regan will institute "rigid corporate order and discipline" in the White House. Regan himself unequivocally said after his new appointment: "The White House chief of staff is the center of power in the administration."

Regan's "undivided rule" will give him much more opportunity to influence the President. He is expected to reduce conflicts between staff members and reduce the unavoidable and deliberate leaks of confidential information from the White House (a widespread practice when one group wants to prevail over another). According to observers, the new chief is distinguished by "the absence of any inclination for analytical thinking"; he 'will tell the President only what he wants to hear.'

Baker's appointment to the prestigious office of secretary of the treasury<sup>5</sup> is viewed, first of all, as a sign of the increasing influence of the White House staff, which served its former chief as a trampoline for a move to such a high position and, secondly, as an indication of the President's evaluation of Baker's performance. Commenting on Baker's appointment, the WASHINGTON POST called him "an extremely capable administrator who can make the policy of the Treasury Department consistent and purposeful."

It is not likely that Baker's transfer to a secretarial position is connected with some kind of long-range political or economic plans. The new secretary of the treasury is only expected to work toward previously set objectives more energetically (the reduction of the budget deficit and the reform of the tax system), objectives which were called "administration priorities" for the second term. According to White House plans, the Regan-Baker "combination" should tactically secure favorable results for the President. And whereas Regan is primarily expected to make White House staff members "speak in unison," Baker, with his rich political experience, his inclination toward compromise and his extensive contacts in Congress and the business community, is supposed to facilitate the "advancement" of administration proposals.

People are also saying that the office of secretary of the treasury and Baker's fairly close ties with Vice-President G. Bush will give the former a chance to play an even more significant role in national politics in the future, especially in the 1988 campaign.

R. Darman, who recently became the deputy chief of the White House staff, is also moving to the Treasury Department. D. Stockman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, who is also a "pragmatist," is preparing to leave.

The appointments of D. Hodel as secretary of the interior, J. Herrington as secretary of energy and W. Bennett as secretary of education were also announced.

Hodel is considered to be the most odious of the three. He was the under secretary of the interior under J. Watt, who resigned in 1983. Public organizations accused him of taking an irresponsible approach to environmental protection. Hodel's return to the Department of the Interior from the Department of Energy testifies that the administration will continue the accelerated and shortsighted exploitation of energy, mineral and other resources on public lands with the aid of private corporations. Commenting on Hodel's appointment, TIME magazine called him a "sinister character."

J. Herrington, formerly the presidential personnel assistant, will succeed Hodel as secretary of energy. Although he has no experience or knowledge in the sphere of energy, as observers have pointed out, he will "carry out White House orders to the letter." A. Mayer, director of Environmental Action, a public organization, maliciously said that Herrington "will preside over the funeral of this department." It has been reported that the chief executive ordered Herrington to prepare recommendations regarding the reorganization of his department. One option consists in the merger of the departments of energy and the interior, and another envisages the elimination of the Department of Energy altogether, with the transfer of several of its strategic resource prerogatives to the Pentagon.

Teachers' unions are pessimistic about W. Bennett's appointment as secretary of education. When he headed the National Foundation on the Humanities, this "neoconservative Democrat" (as he calls himself) who shares all of the President's views, was a steadfast opponent of increases in federal education

expenditures. Observers doubt that Bennett will stay in this office for long. Reagan asked him to analyze department activities to determine the "most expedient organizational structure." This could actually mean the elimination of the department, which has been considered for a long time in Washington.

Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige's proposal regarding the creation of a new department in charge of foreign trade and industry has also been the subject of discussion. Predictably, this idea has been resisted, particularly by G. Shultz and C. Weinberger, because the creation of this department would certainly reduce the jurisdiction of the State Department and Pentagon.

Finally, in the middle of March the White House announced the appointment of W. Brock, U.S. trade representative, as secretary of labor. As observers have pointed out, Brock has inherited a department paralyzed by inaction from R. Donovan, who was accused of criminal ties with the Mafia.

As for Donovan, he will be tried on 137 counts ("grand larceny and fraud," perjury, the embezzlement of municipal funds, graft, the coercion of labor unions, violations of labor legislation, etc.). Back in the 1970's, when the millionaire secretary and wheeler-dealer was vice president of the Schiavone Construction firm, he pocketed 7.4 million dollars of the funds allocated for subway construction in New York. He was an extremely generous contributor to Reagan's 1980 campaign. When the President reported his resignation, he expressed "deep personal regrets."

How will these personnel changes affect the balance of power in the Reagan team? The American press has made many predictions. In the next few years, the Shultz-Regan-Baker-McFarlane group is expected to control decisions on current political issues. There has been a perceptible increase in Shultz' influence, and he frankly admitted in one interview that he intends to become a "master of foreign policy." In the struggle for influence in foreign and military policy, the Shultz group will be opposed by an equally influential trio, C. Weinberger, W. Casey and R. Perle, the assistant secretary of defense who, according to THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, was "an active participant in military policymaking throughout the past 4 years." Shultz' claims are therefore not at all indisputable.

Finally, the current balance of power is changeable and conditional. After all, it essentially reflects alliances made during President Reagan's first term. The only preliminary conclusion which can be drawn from the new appointments is that key positions have been retained by politicians in total agreement with the President.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The department is mainly in charge of natural resources.
2. For a description of the White House staff, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 12, pp 100-106--Editor's note.

3. In 1984 the procedure of approving Meese's appointment in the Senate was deliberately delayed until the presidential election, but then the matter was added to the Senate agenda in 1985 and his appointment was approved.
4. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 5, pp 126-127.
5. In the Washington hierarchy the secretary of the treasury ranks fifth (after the vice-president, speaker of the House, president pro tem of the Senate and secretary of state) in the line of succession for the presidency in the event of the death or resignation of the chief executive.

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## BOOK OF ARBATOV INTERVIEWS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 98-100

[Review by V. F. Petrovskiy of book "Vstupaya v 80-ye.... Kniga-intervyu ob aktualnykh voprosakh sovremennoykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy" [Entering the 1980's.... Book-Length Interview on Urgent Problems in Contemporary International Relations] by Georgiy Arbatov and Willem Oltmans, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1984, 334 pages: "Vital Issues of the Day"]

[Text] The nuclear age urgently demands a new way of political thinking. The most urgent and vital problem now concerning all people on earth is the problem of preventing nuclear war. The nature of modern weapons--both existing ones and those that might be developed--dictates the need for changes in the traditional view of the entire problem of war and peace. The technological revolution, especially in two fields, nuclear energy and outer space, must no longer result in the development of more and more new weapons of war, as this process will eventually lead to the self-annihilation of the human race. The aggressive imperialist circles which are still pursuing the impossible dream of military superiority to the Soviet Union and its allies and are thinking in terms of "limited," "brief" and "protracted" nuclear or "star" wars, are trapped by obsolete stereotypes, dating back to an era when war was a great disaster, but did not threaten universal death as it does now. The only reasonable alternative is the cessation and reversal of the arms race on earth and its prevention in space. This is the goal of Soviet foreign policy and this is the hope of all healthy forces in the world.

The subject of this review, a book based on a great deal of factual and analytical material, is compiled in the original format of an interview of Academician G. A. Arbatov by Dutch journalist W. Oltmans. The range of topics is extremely broad. It includes theoretical questions--for instance, the possibility of peaceful coexistence by states of opposing systems (pp 38-40)--and purely "technical" ones--the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of modern weapons in the U.S. and USSR arsenals (pp 176-180), and matters of practical policy and alternative ways of settling disputes. Furthermore, Oltmans was not always tactful when he asked these questions, but he invariably received complete answers to the most pointed and straightforward questions. Permeated with a sense of responsibility for the state of international affairs, the book is a striking example of the application

of political realism to the theory and practice of international relations, especially relations between the USSR and the United States.

This is genuine political realism, in sharp contrast to the theories and views, isolated from the realities of today's world, of the politicians in the United States (and other Western countries) who call themselves "political realists" but rely on arms buildups and power politics in relations with other states and peoples. In contrast to this, the book demonstrates, genuine political realism presupposes an integral view of a reliable and just system of international security and cooperation on the global and regional levels. It is precisely this kind of view, the book stresses, that is clearly demonstrated by the foreign policy actions and proposals of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

"We are realists," G. A. Arbatov writes, "and we realize that the struggle to establish this kind of system will entail colossal difficulties; after all, this will necessitate the elimination of the traditions and tactics of power politics from international practice, traditions which took shape over centuries and are now regarded by the most aggressive imperialist circles as the only effective way of 'saving the West.' It is precisely because we are realists that we realize that the nuclear age has faced mankind with a clear choice: It must either find enough strength and intelligence within itself to learn to live in a new way, or it can die in the flames of a nuclear catastrophe" (pp 4-5).

The thorough analysis of the development of international relations in the 1970's in this book leaves no doubt that powerful forces are promoting a reasonable, realistic and responsible approach to matters of war and peace. Together, they can win great and tangible victories in the struggle against nuclear adventurism and eventually triumph over it. But it is another grim reality that all of these forces must display constant vigilance.

The spiral of the arms race, set in motion by the decision of the Washington (1978) NATO session on the annual increase of 3 percent in the military budgets of bloc members for the next 15 years, is being tightened. This is a result of the deployment of the new medium-range American missiles in Western Europe and the creation of other nuclear missile systems designed for a first strategic strike against the Soviet Union. It is also the result of new and important technological innovations in antimissile and antisubmarine systems, capable of creating the impression that the country taking such action is striving for first-strike potential.

"Even if there were no basis for anxiety and fear," G. A. Arbatov says, "they would still be dangerous because they make security and survival conditional upon instantaneous readiness to deliver a retaliatory or even a preventive strike. And I am not even speaking of the effect of this anxiety on the political atmosphere." New weapon systems, the book stresses, "threaten to destroy the very basis of arms control talks" (pp 151-152).

One warning that seems particularly pertinent today is that "Reagan's pre-occupation with a space-based ABM system, although the majority of scientists, both Soviet and American, believe it is technically impracticable (at least

in the foreseeable future), is extremely dangerous. Even if it remains a fantasy, it will engender illusions about the U.S. ability to protect itself against a retaliatory strike and will escalate the race for nuclear weapons, both defensive and offensive" (pp 6-7).

Specific facts are cited in the book as convincing arguments to refute the allegations of apologists for the arms race that larger weapon stockpiles will strengthen U.S. security and improve the chances for success in the arms limitation and reduction talks. These allegations are supposed to justify the American side's constant attempts to make breakthroughs in the arms sphere and to talk to the USSR from a position of strength. The militarist policy of the arms race is having the most negative effect on international security, including the security of the United States. "When the world is overloaded with weapons," G. A. Arbatov stresses, "their use as a result of the escalation of international tension and of various international conflicts is fully possible. The possibility of the accidental start of war cannot be excluded either" (p 136).

The ill-intentioned lies of militarist circles in the West about the "Soviet military threat" are exposed in detail. Arbatov quite justifiably calls this "the biggest lie of the 20th century. Furthermore, it is the most dangerous lie because it paves the way for an unbridled arms race and increased international friction and heightens the risk of universal nuclear annihilation" (p 9).

A policy based on a break with reality, not to mention its deliberate distortion, leads to an impasse. The book leaves no doubts about this. Whether the subject is U.S. policy in any region or policy in any sphere--arms, trade and economic relations or basic human rights and freedoms--it is futile. This has been confirmed by history and by current events. The author recalls the failures resulting from the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe, which did not strengthen the security of the United States and its allies but had the opposite result (p 8). Washington's interventionist line, which escalated tension in the Middle East, also failed (p 124).

In reference to the policy line chosen by the American administration which entered the White House in the 1980's, G. A. Arbatov correctly notes: "Reagan's foreign policy turned out to be located in some kind of dream world, trying to rest on the dead postulates of the cold war, on its myths and delusions, dating back to the first years after the war, when many believed that the 'American age' had begun." These illusions, the book says, must now be paid for with the aggravation of old problems and the appearance of new ones in American foreign policy. "But the price of American delusions might be too high--and not only for the Americans but for the rest of the world as well" (p 125).

The militarist and interventionist tendencies in Washington's foreign policy are being countered by the policy of other countries, the common sense of Americans and the survival instinct of the human race. The public antiwar, antinuclear and antimissile movement of unprecedented scales throughout the world became a new and powerful factor curbing the adventurism of war's

apologists in the 1980's. All of this, the book says, is reinforcing realistic principles in American policy and encouraging a move toward the realization of extremely serious and vitally important common interests--the interests of peace and survival--which demand not only negotiations, but also agreements and the overall improvement of relations between the USSR and the United States. The heightened danger of war in this decade has made "a thorough understanding of the realities of the nuclear age and the proper respect for these realities in practical policy" more necessary than ever before (p 137).

This statement is extremely pertinent today, now that Soviet initiatives have resulted in new USSR-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. All of the experience of recent decades testifies that the success of these talks will require both sides to give up the hope of unilateral advantages and military superiority, to work toward the cessation of the arms race and toward the actual and substantial reduction of weapon stockpiles, and not toward the development of new systems, whether in space or on earth. The Soviet Union is known to be guided precisely by this approach.

In the middle of the 1980's the human race has reason to experience the most serious worries about its future and to feel optimistic. An intense battle is being waged by two tendencies in world politics--the tendency of reason, responsibility and realism, and the tendency toward reckless actions pushing the world into the nuclear abyss. Although the Soviet Union is the most consistent supporter of the first line, while the second tendency is characteristic of the United States, military confrontation and conflicts between these two major powers are certainly not inevitable. After all, the position of common sense, the position of survival, corresponds in the final analysis to the vital interests of the United States and the USSR. This is why the conclusion to which the reader of this book is led is so important: "Without detente between our countries, the entire world will have an uncertain future, and sooner or later everyone will have to accept this fact unconditionally. It is extremely important to do this before it is too late. The survival of the human race will require effort on the part of each and every person" (p 14).

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## U.S. BOOK ON U.S. NUCLEAR WAR PLANS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 101-104

[Review by G. M. Sturua of book "SIOP. The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War" by Peter Pringle and William Arkin, New York-London, W. W. Norton and Company, 1983, X + 287 pages: "The 'Nuclear Genie' out of the President's Briefcase"]

[Text] For many years each American President has been accompanied at all times by an officer wherever he goes, whether he is leaving the country or just leaving the building. The officer carries a black briefcase. It is known that it contains the most confidential documents of a military nature, which must be within the President's reach at all times. In particular, they tell the President how to give the order for the use of nuclear weapons and what options he can exercise in the use of nuclear forces.

The authors of this book wanted to shed more light on the nature of these documents. P. Pringle and W. Arkin are a well-matched pair in this respect. The former, the American correspondent of the English weekly OBSERVER, is a typical representative of the "investigative" school of Western journalism. The second is an American researcher and expert on U.S. nuclear strategy who was one of the compilers of an encyclopaedia of nuclear weapons and was once an Army intelligence officer.

How were the authors able to approach the "holy of holies" of Washington military preparations? In their investigation, Pringle and Arkin used many sources, including information on the early stages of nuclear planning, published in 1983 by D. Rosenberg, D. Boll and others.\* It was taken from several documents of the 1940's and 1950's, which were recently declassified in the United States. The partial declassification was conducted in accordance with existing U.S. regulations: The information made public did not jeopardize national security.

The latest stage in the development of U.S. nuclear strategy ended in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Its aggressive, adventurist aims immediately

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\* See V. L. Chernov, "Strategy of the Absurd," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 7--Editor's note.

evoked a strong wave of public criticism. To soften this negative impression, representatives of the last two administrations have tried to say that the new strategy has no fundamentally new elements and that it only clarifies ideas that became part of the strategy decades ago. The partial publication of official documents, accompanied by attacks on the policy of the USSR, which was allegedly threatening U.S. security, was supposed to reinforce these statements.

Books and magazines on military and military-technical subjects were another source of information for Pringle and Arkin. The authors found many facts in reports of congressional committee hearings. It is true that the information from this source is often of an "advertising" nature and serves the goals of "psychological warfare" and of pressure on a presumed adversary. Conversely, it sometimes understates the potential capabilities of U.S. Armed Forces or says nothing at all about them. Sometimes the legislators are simply encouraging congressional generosity in the allocation of funds for military needs. For this reason, this source of information is not completely reliable.

Examining these and other data, the authors shed light on one important matter: Who in the United States is capable of controlling the behavior of the "nuclear genie" the Manhattan Project let out of the bottle in 1945? How can he control it, and to what degree can he control it?\* In our day, now that the American administration is making plans for a "victorious" nuclear war and carrying out programs to create first-strike potential, no one can remain indifferent to these questions. Pringle and Arkin demonstrate the irrational nature of the basic premises of nuclear planning in the United States, the technical unreliability of the entire group of nuclear control systems and the destabilizing aspects of the procedures for putting plans for the use of nuclear weapons "in action." All of this leads them to the conclusion that the American administration's declared belief in "limited" or "protracted" nuclear wars could have catastrophic results. In their opinion, military and political leaders are incapable of controlling the escalation of a nuclear conflict. The authors cite the words of military expert D. Boll and agree with his opinion that "it is highly improbable that an exchange of nuclear strikes can be limited by counterforce operations of a presumably surgical nature" (p 193).

The United States did not arrive immediately at the idea of "limited," "counter-force" and other such wars, the authors write. The first American plans for atomic warfare, dating back to the 1940's, envisaged the strategic bombing of the cities of America's recent ally, the USSR, which had still not recovered fully from its bloody battles with fascism. Pringle and Arkin list these plans: "Broiler" (1947) envisaged the destruction of 24 cities with 34 bombs, "Trojan" (1948) planned the destruction of 70 cities with 133 bombs, and "Offtackle" (1949) planned the destruction of 104 cities with 220 bombs (p 62).

Although the authors do not write about this, it must be said that the sinister plans were drawn up in isolation from reality. In the first place, the

\* For more detail, see V. M. Berezhkov, "The Roots of Washington's Atomic Diplomacy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 10--Editor's note.

United States did not have the necessary quantity of nuclear munitions to carry out these plans or airfields near the USSR from which the medium bombers could operate. In the second place, the American command did not have accurate maps of the Soviet Union and therefore could not be certain that the planes would find their targets. The U.S. military and political leaders were not even certain that their existing nuclear strength would be enough to defeat the USSR. This is why the United States decided not to make use of the potential advantages of its nuclear monopoly.

Its unexpected loss forced the United States to reassess its nuclear plans. Destroying the "Soviet ability to deliver nuclear strikes" was the first priority. The second was the destruction of targets to "weaken Soviet military efforts" (railroads, stations, airports, docks, etc.). The destruction of urban and industrial targets was moved to third place (p 56). At the same time, until the beginning of the 1960's the plans called, and the authors point this out, for a massive strike against all types of targets.

The use of national technical equipment (especially space vehicles) allowed the American command to find more and more new targets for nuclear strikes. In turn, the increase in their number stimulated the stepped-up production of nuclear weapons (p 48). In 1960 the list of targets already included 20,000 objectives, and the number of strategic nuclear warheads had reached 18,000 (p 107).

After 1960 the nuclear planning function was concentrated in a special strategic target planning group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It oversaw the compilation of the single integrated operation plan for nuclear war--SIOP--in which the means and methods of destroying targets were specified (pp 112, 116).

Just as other plans in the past, SIOP-1, which was approved in December 1960, envisaged the simultaneous destruction of military and civilian targets. Even then, however, experts from the RAND Corporation and members of the naval command were insisting on a move toward a strategy of selective strikes against enemy strategic forces. Although this was often validated with the highest "moral" considerations--the "counterforce" strikes would allegedly be accompanied by minimal civilian losses--the actual reasons for this revision of strategy were quite different, but the authors of the book never discuss them frankly. The frenzied search for alternative ways of using nuclear strength was dictated by Washington's hope of finding a way out of the "nuclear deadlock" resulting from the equalization of Soviet and U.S. military-strategic forces. The American command tried to find the kind of optimal combination of targets whose destruction would, on the one hand, put the adversary in a difficult position and, on the other, not provoke a reaction in kind--that is, nuclear revenge.

The huge American intelligence community was not any less active in subsequent decades. On the contrary, more and more new targets were added to the list: SIOP-5, approved in 1980, already envisaged the destruction of 40,000 objects (p 186). This plan was drawn up by the Carter Administration, which elaborated its own nuclear strategy. The roots of its innovations in this field

are clearly discerned by P. Pringle and W. Arkin in the "counterforce" theory of R. McNamara (secretary of defense in the Kennedy Administration) and the "limited" nuclear war theory of J. Schlesinger, former Pentagon chief under President Nixon. In essence, the Carter Administration's innovations consisted in the fact that in its strategy of nuclear strikes against the USSR, "the emphasis was shifted from economic targets to military ones and to military communication and control systems. As for the U.S. Armed Forces, they were trained to 'survive' a lengthy nuclear war, which could go on for months" (pp 191-192). In general, however, Carter's nuclear strategy was, as the authors write, a summarization and compilation of various ideas proposed by previous administrations since the 1960's.

The authors maintain that President Carter was full of good intentions with regard to disarmament and renounced them only under the influence of the results of studies of the "Soviet military threat" by anti-Soviet experts from the so-called "Group B," which "convinced" him of the existence of this threat (pp 194-196).

But the authors' assumption raises serious objections. The fact is that the administration's first SALT proposals proved that the substantial arms reductions it had promised were contrary to the accepted principle of equality and equivalent security, and in this sense they did not differ much from the views expressed by the "Group B" experts.

Pringle and Arkin do not say much about the nuclear policy of the Reagan Administration in this work. The book was completed by the middle of Reagan's first term in office, before he announced the "strategic defense initiative." The authors write that the Reagan Administration only clarified elements of the strategy it inherited, and did not enrich it with any new ideas. Nevertheless, even then they were able to conclude that "Jimmy Carter left behind a strategy of 'deterrence' so similar to a strategy of warfare that it was consistent with the Republican promise of 'nuclear superiority'" (p 242). Nevertheless, Pringle and Arkin were able to discern the new trends that later were reflected in President Reagan's nuclear strategy. "Nuclear forces were supposed to be capable of fighting a protracted war and winning it" (p 243). In this way, after a long interval the idea of "victory" in nuclear war was declared again by American leaders in the 1980's.

The authors correctly note that the Reagan Administration is carrying on the tradition of building up strategic potential but is concentrating on the improvement of communication and control systems. Their modernization is viewed as the key factor on which the implementation of the American administration's adventurist policy will depend (pp 220-240).

This description of the contents of the black briefcase will be incomplete without some mention of another aspect singled out by the authors for special consideration. Pringle and Arkin focus on the role of the American military in nuclear planning and in decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. General C. LeMay, who headed the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the early 1950's, for example, actually usurped the compilation of U.S. nuclear plans, and he did not bother to inform the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their details

(pp 44-47). This general, who personally chose "Peace Is Our Profession" as the SAC motto, expressed the interesting opinion that the renunciation of preventive strikes would be contrary to American history (p 45). He was guided by this belief when he drew up operational nuclear plans, intensifying the preparation of strategic aviation for the delivery of a first strike. Subsequent generations of American military leaders proved to be just as loyal to this tradition.

In the 1960's the military began to gradually lose much of its autonomy in the compilation of nuclear plans. Presidents, defense secretaries and civilian presidential advisers became increasingly involved in this work. As early as 1948, a National Security Council document (NSC-30) officially secured the President's right to make his own decisions about the use of nuclear weapons.

But the civilian control of the nuclear arsenal, Pringle and Arkin state, is certainly not as efficient as it is said to be in the United States. A document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS-13, stipulates that if the President and vice-president should be unable to carry out their duties, the secretary of defense, the JCS chairman and several other commanders can give the order for the use of nuclear weapons until a new President has been elected (p 200). In particular, a brigadier general on board a command airplane in flight in a crisis situation has access to the codes for the issuance of such an order (p 206). This means that the military is capable in principle of starting a nuclear war without the appropriate presidential order. The unauthorized start of a nuclear war by the notorious "crazy colonel" is a very real danger. In fact, it would be even more accurate to say that the very system which has left the future of the world hanging by a hair is insane.

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## BOOK STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING AMERICAN MARKETING METHODS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 107-108

[Review by A. B. Terekhov of book "Nekotoryye voprosy povysheniya effektivnosti eksporta" [Some Questions About Heightening the Effectiveness of Exports] by A. V. Yengibarov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, 238 pages: "Analyzing American Experience"]

[Text] V. I. Lenin's works repeatedly point out the need to "scoop up good foreign experience with both hands."\* In particular, he mentioned the importance of studying the commercial experience of capitalist countries.\*\* The author of this monograph analyzes the experience of American and other Western firms in the development of foreign markets and uses this as a basis to recommend ways of heightening the effectiveness of Soviet foreign trade.

The modern market analyses of companies in capitalist countries are based on marketing principles. With the aid of these, economic conditions are forecasted and an export strategy is planned. It consists of three main parts: the regulation of product variety, pricing policy and the system of sales organization. The role of the price factor has changed considerably, the author says, but it has not lost its importance. For this reason, flexible prices and "price maneuvers" can aid in the attainment of various goals of market strategy by influencing customers, competitors and retail trade.

The most popular form of sales organization in foreign markets consists of two links, the author says: a wholesale firm and a retail sales firm. Of course, the economic machinery of the functioning of sales structures in Western companies differs radically from the mechanism of Soviet foreign trade organizations. The profit margin is the criterion of the effectiveness of exports from the United States and other capitalist countries, while sales volume is only a means of increasing total profits. If the further growth of this volume is inconsistent with the goal of maximizing the profit margin, the level of the firm's turnover is restricted, and operating at a loss reduces sales activity (the laws of some countries prohibit prolonged

\* V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 550.

\*\* Ibid., vol 45, p 373.

operation at a loss) (pp 110, 112). In USSR foreign trade, on the other hand, the main indicator is the projected sales volume (p 72).

All changes in the world market must be taken into account in the planning of an export strategy--primarily changes in such areas as competitive potential, the international license trade, the government stimulation of foreign trade in capitalist countries, forms of commission sales, advertising, etc. Of all the networks for the sale of goods abroad, the author writes, the most preferable one for Soviet foreign trade organizations is the joint-stock society contracted to import goods from the USSR and provide pre- and post-sale services. A large national firm with a monopoly on the sale of items in the domestic market can serve as the general distributor (pp 106, 113). An analysis of the latest tendencies in the foreign trade activity of capitalist countries, including the United States, convinces the author that the new forms of trade in machines and equipment must be instituted on a broader scale: More unassembled machines and technical items can be exported (p 123) and customer service of a higher order can be offered, because the production of spare parts and technical maintenance services are twice as profitable as the production of the main equipment (p 150). It is also important to use the latest forms of commercial advertising more actively.

To heighten the role of manufactured goods in Soviet exports and their effectiveness, the author recommends the accelerated incorporation of goal-oriented plans covering all stages from development to production and the appropriate system of financing (p 180). The organization of quality control must also be improved with the aid of foreign experience, including the American experience in the short- and long-range planning and control of the technical parameters of products (pp 185-186). It would also be expedient to secure the priority development of industries capable of significantly increasing foreign currency receipts from exports over 5 or 10 years with relatively low expenditures and as quickly as possible, with a view to world market conditions (p 193)--these are the automotive, aircraft and shipbuilding industries and industries producing metal-cutting tools, forging and pressing equipment and agricultural equipment.

The establishment of this kind of export base in Soviet industry, in the author's opinion, will require a better economic mechanism. He lists some of the most promising areas of development (pp 223-228).

The consideration of a system of long-range interdepartmental coordination for the development of industrial exports is particularly important at present, the author says, now that the food and energy programs are being carried out and programs are being drawn up for the development of consumer goods production and public services. This would be a system for the economic coordination of all stages of this development, from the investment of capital to the post-sale maintenance of items sold abroad.

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## BOOK ON U.S. TV BROADCASTING REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) p 109

[Review by I. A. Geyevskiy of book "Generatory dezinformatsii" [Producers of Misinformation] by V. D. Nikolayev, Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1984, 95 pages: "Television at the Service of the Monopolies"]

[Text] The ideological information complex plays an important role in the spiritual and sociopolitical life of the United States. On the basis of numerous facts, documents and personal impressions, the author of this book reveals the workings of the huge American propaganda machine.

Television stations, especially the three "big sisters"--the giants of the television industry, the NBC, CBS and ABC companies--play an important role in the development of American views and tastes. By the age of 18, American calculations indicate, the average American has put in around 20,000 hours of "television service" (p 9). Television has become the chief instructor, the major propaganda sounding-board and the generator of American stereotypes regarding the United States and the world in general. Journalist W. Lippman's remark that the stereotype relieves the "common man of the responsibility to explain causes" of events, quoted in the book (p 12), sounds even more pertinent today than before. Television and the other mass media are particularly effective in generating and disseminating various myths calculated to frighten the American viewer: "Red is anti-American," "the Soviet threat," "the inferiority of non-white citizens"--these are examples of these false stereotypes.

The effective use of TV programs to exert emotional pressure on the population entails the constant perfection of methods and means of making the ideological content of programs imperceptible to the viewer. Nevertheless, as V. Nikolayev demonstrates, a careful look at the endless stream of the most diverse programs clearly reveals the common propaganda tricks of mass hypnosis and "mass psychotherapy" (p 11).

The author tells how gigantic industrial conglomerates become the owners of TV companies, newspapers, magazines and film studios. "Today the news industry is big business," former U.S. Treasury Secretary J. Connally said with complete justification (p 8). News media are being concentrated within the hands of the monopolistic elite. But this is only one side of the process. It is

being accompanied by the expansion of the propaganda activity of government agencies, employing around 5,000 information specialists. Private and government mass media interact closely, combining to make up a huge state-monopolist propaganda machine for the performance of general functions and the cultivation of anticommunism and bourgeois individualism in Americans. The author says that the obsession with violence and brutality is spreading throughout the country and is resulting in the more intense moral decay of society.

The pages describing how the Hollywood dream factory is turning into a horror factory are interesting. The author also describes how the latest achievements of the technological revolution (computers and so forth) are being used more and more in the information and entertainment industry to attain the traditional goals of the dominant class--the retention of spiritual control over the society and the spread of misinformation.

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## BOOK ON IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 17 May 85) pp 109-110

[Review by M. I. Lapitskiy of book "Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost" [The Iranian Revolution, the United States and International Security] by S. L. Agayev, Moscow, Nauka, 1984, 278 pages: "'Morality' in Politics"]

[Text] This study discusses American policy in Iran in President Carter's time. The author concentrates on an analysis of the events connected with the 444 days during which the American diplomats were held hostage (from late 1979 to early 1981). The skillful combination of a scientific approach and a popular narrative style produces a vivid and lively impression.

The author scrupulously examines all of the reversals surrounding the hostage crisis and the dramatic clashes between Iran and the United States, shedding light on all of the strategic moves of the Carter Administration. He discusses the motives of the leaders of the Iranian revolution and of Washington politicians, who seemed to be living, according to the author's eloquent description, on two different planets. The "image of Carter," a man "with a gentle exterior, but an extremely rigid and stubborn politician" (p 37), is present on every page. The author shows how the public statements by Carter and other U.S. administration spokesmen during the entire hostage crisis combined attacks on the "fanatical" regime in Iran with attacks on progressive forces, especially the Soviet Union.

The sections of the book describing the activities of the powerful and diversified U.S. propaganda machine are also interesting. They tell how this machine used the hostage crisis to mold public opinion in the United States and in the developing countries. Many pages of the book offer vivid examples of the moral principles characteristic of American imperialist policy and, as the opposite side of this coin, policy in the sphere of morality (the author of the foreword, R. A. Ulyanovskiy, directs special attention to S. L. Agayev's analysis of precisely this aspect of his subject). There is no question that gambling with the future of the world and the lives of the hostages themselves for the purpose of diverting the attention of the common American away from urgent domestic problems and of enhancing the President's injured prestige testifies that the "born-again Christians" (represented by

Jimmy Carter and his administration) were least concerned with questions of morality.

S. L. Agayev's book, which raises important questions about morality in contemporary international politics, is of indisputable value: The reader of this history of the hostage crisis will gain a clear understanding of how "big policy" is made in Washington.

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